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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
In general, traditional philosophy prior to Kant
envisioned the world as something inexorably given to the
inquiring mind. The inquirer, though part of nature, was
assumed to be outside of nature—
—in a sense, an observer.
The world and the inquirer were related as object is to
subject. Kant's doctrine of transcendental idealism partly
reversed the order of this relationship. He considered the
matter of the natural world as given, but the form of the
world as supplied by the inquirer. In effect, the inquirer
imposes a structure upon the world. In the realm of
perception or sensibility, this structure consists of the
pure forms of space and time. According to Kant, then, the
mind orders the manifold of sensation through application of
the a priori unifying forms of space and time. Furthermore,
in the realm of the understanding, certain necessary
categories of thought are understood as the criteria and set
of rules through which the manifold of spat iotemporally
ordered sensation becomes known to thought.
However, Kant's transcendental system was mainly
descriptive. There still remained the problem of explaining
why particulars are positioned where they are in time and
space. In other words, why does one perceive things as one
ii
does and not otherwise? A more general explanation was
needed to account for the peculiar pervasiveness of time and
space in perception and conception as well as an account of
the positioning of particulars within time and space. In
addition, within the realm of the understanding, the Kantian
categories proved insufficient in describing all judgements.
Moreover, inconsistencies within Kant's transcendental
framework pointed toward new formulations of his basic
principles.
Neo-Kantians, such as Von Humboldt and Cassirer,
endeavoring to give greater explanatory power to the Kantian
hypothesis, contended that a third unifying agent, linguistic
necessity, is a more basic and comprehensive unifying agent
or form than space and time. Moreover, language was seen to
provide a more inclusive set of categories ordering
conceptual activities. Thus, Kant's system is seen to rest
securely upon the power of language as a conditioning agent
in sensibility, perception, understanding, and reason in
general
.
Contemporaneous with the work of Ernst Cassirer, a
famous linguist, Edward Sapir, uncovered some important facts
concerning the relationship between language and thought
which were to be later developed and systematized by his
disciple, Benjamin Lee Whorf. What emerged from the works
of these two men is the so-called "Whorf-Sapir hypothesis."
In essence, their doctrine mirrors the neo-Kantian contention,
but claims to present empirical evidence on its behalf. As
iii
such, their endeavor purports to add substance to the Kantian
system by giving It a base in language, empirically verifiable
through the sciences of linguistics and anthropology.
Throughout these developments, philosophy witnessed the
coming of a new philosophical movement. Sired by the great
English philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein
,
this movement, called
linguistic philosophy or analysis, brought it3 new methods to
bear upon the problem at hand: the relation between language
and thought. In this philosophical tradition, P. F. Strawson
has formulated a ’'metaphysics" which seems to support a
milder form of the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis. Strawson was led
to recognize, through epistemological and linguistic
considerations, the existence of a conceptual scheme which
we all must possess as a condition of our communicating with
one another. The nature of this scheme is seen to be mainly
spatiotemporal. Although developed without explicit reference
to the Kantian system, Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics may
be seen to furth r bolster the Kantian contention in the face
of its ;ost devastating criticism.
It is the purpose of this paper to examine the
philosophical contentions of Whorf
,
Sapir, and Strawson, in
regard to the relationship between language, the rare forms
of space and time, and the Kantian categories of the under-
standing. This endeavor will proceed from an exposition of
t lie Kantian position concerning the a priori structuring of
raw sensation and the functioning of the understanding to
criticism of these views and their subsequent implicit
iv
reformulations with reference to linguistic considerations.
This will involve an exposition of the possible senses of
the philosophies of Thorf, Sapir and Strawson as they pertain
to the matter at hand; the senses in which language conditions
or determines the Kantian a priori particulars of time and
space and supplies the pure concepts of the understanding.
It is hoped that this enquiry will aid in rendering explicit
the modern belief in the necessary connection between
language, thought, and reality.
PART ONE
KANTIAN TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM IN BRIEF
I. KANTIAN TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAL! S IN .RIEF
A. The Copernican Revolution
Modern philosophy began with faith. Religion gave to
man a sense of general optimism and faith in the future. It
is natural, then, that the first modern philosophers had
complete faith in the power of the human mind to attain
knowledge. These philosophers, alike in their spiritual
beliefs, differed as to the methods by which such knowledge
could be reached and how far its limits extended. Rational-
ists, empiricists, realists, and nominalists of the age all
understood genuine knowledge as that which is clearly and
distinctly perceived as universal and necessary. How this
knowledge was to be attained posed a great problem to them.
The seventeenth century was a century that witnessed
unparalleled progress in physics and mathematics. The success
of mathematics and the mathematical method left a great mark
upon philosophy. It was seen that it was possible to achieve
certainty in mathematics while other disciplines resulted in
only probable knowledge. Philosophers of the day, aware of
age-old controversies in philosophy, hoped that by application
of the mathematical rnethod--deduction from "self-evident"
axioms according to rigorous, fixed rules— solutions to
philosophical problems could achieve a similar certainty.
2The application of mathematical techniques to the
measurable properties of what the senses revealed became the
sole true method of philosophical inquiry and exposition.
Descartes systematically doubted all that was given to him
in sense-awareness in the hope of finding, by the light of
nature, clear and distinct self-evident truths from which
solutions to philosophical questions may be deduced.
Analogously, Spinoza and Hobbes seek to give their reasoning
a structure of a mathematical kind. Such a method was called
"Nationalism." Thus, traditional rationalists expressed the
belief in the power of the human mind to attain absolute
knowledge through the mathematical method of inquiry."^
The advent of the physical sciences, literally, brought
man to his senses. The spectacular results of Newton re-
kindled an interest in the material world. The philosophical
procedure of developing "first principles" and "clear and
distinct ideas" slowly gave way to the criterion of experi-
mental evidence. Observation and experimentation supplanted
the method of final causes as a valid philosophical procedure.
As mathematics left its mark upon the philosophy of the early
seventeenth century, so the experimental method influenced
the philosophy of the late seventeenth century and eighteenth
century. The scientific attitude is exceedingly clear in the
works of Locke and Hume, who both had a profound respect for
1Cf. Frank Thilly, A History of Philosophy (New York:
Henry Holt and Co,, 1927*5”] p] 393*
3natural science, and also in those of Berkeley, who was deeply
concerned to deny its metaphysical presuppositions. To all
of them the model was contemporary physics and mechanics.^
•
rith the coming of science and scientific methodology,
the rationalistic theory of knowledge, with its reference to
a priori ideas, became, to the philosophers of the day,
obsolete. A new epistemology was needed that would conform
to the rlew scientific spirit of observation and experimentation.
From the point of view of an empiricist, how does one account
for or define knowledge if sense experience is taken as a
criterion? Moreover, this criterion of sense experience
implies man as the instrument and source of knowledge. As
the senses were considered fallible, so human knowledge was
considered capable of fallacies. Since man is the basis of
knowledge, and all knowledge is necessarily human knowledge,
it was seen that knowledge depends on the nature of man and
his intellect. J These were the mainsprings of classical
empiricism.
Kant thus inherited two traditions of thought, namely
rationalism and empiricism. In his day, their chief spokesmen
were, respectively, Leibniz and Hume. Leibniz argues lor the
self-legislative character of pure thought. He agrees with
the dictum of Saint Thomas Aquinas, "There is nothing in the
intellect which is not first in the senses," but adds, "except
2
Ibid.
,
p. 250 .
3lbid . t p. 3^5
•
4the intellect itself.” Sense experience, he maintains, reveals
reality only in proportion to which it embodies principles
derived from the inherent character of thought itself.
Experience conforms to a priori principles and so can afford
an adequate basis for scientific induction/ 1
Hume, on the other hand, questions our right to assume
the principle that every change has a cause. He does so on
the grounds that the principle insists on the necessary
connection of two concepts between which no connection can be
detected by the mind. In other words, there is no necessary
connection between cause and effect, experience only finds
that one event follows another.^ This far-reaching conclusion,
that the principle of causality has no possible rational basis,
Hume extends and reinforces through his other doctrines—that
so-called "synthetic reason" is merely generalized belief.
Thus, reason justifies itself by practical use, but can afford
6
no standard to which objective reality must conform.
Kant was educated in the Leibnizian tradition. However,
it was Hume's empiricism that "awoke him from his dogmatic
slumber." While recognizing Hume's empiricism as significant,
Kant also recognized the force of his arguments against the
^Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, "Discourse on Metaphysics,"
Leibniz
—
Basic Writings (La Salle, 111.: Open Court, 1957;,
p. 4'5f.
^David Hume, "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,"
The Empiricists (Garden City, N. Y. : Doubleday, I960), p. 322 f.
^Cf. Anthony Flew, Hume's Philosophy of Belief (London:
Houtledge and Keegan PauT7 1961 ) , p! lOoT
5presuppositions of science. In the wake of Hume, the results
of science were no longer "certain" as the rationalists had
held. If Hume was right, then science collapses to a mere
science of chance justified only by its practical use.
Consequently, Kant's problem was to reconcile the
Leibnizian view of the function of thought with Hume's view
of the synthetic character of the causal principle. He thus
strove to determine how much of Leibniz's belief in the
legislative power of pure reason can be retained after full
justice has been done to Hume's damaging criticisms.'7 The
question with which Kant was to deal effected a synthesis of
rationalism and empiricism; that is, if the fundamental
principles upon which all experience and all knowledge depend
are synthetic in nature, how is it possible that they also be
a priori?
The answer to this question constitutes the whole of the
Kantian transcendental scheme which will be dealt with shortly.
Suffice it to say that Kant believed that the answer to this
question lies in the possibility of synthetic a priori
8judgements. Such judgements arise from our peculiar ways of
knowing. According to Kant, the senses furnish the materials
of our knowledge and the mind arranges them in ways made
necessary by its own nature. The content of our knowledge is
9
Gf. Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's Critique of
Pure season (London: Macmillan and Go.
,
1918)
,
p. xxvf
.
^Gf. H. J. Pa ton, Kant's Metaphysics of Experience (London:
Allen and Unwin Ltd., and Mew York: Macmillan and Co., 1951) » Vol. .
I, p. 76.
6derived from experience ( empiricism)
,
but the mind conceives
it according to a priori principles (rationalism) given by
the mind itself. In such a scheme we may have certainty of
knowledge, but such knowledge would apply only to the apparent
world— the world ordered by mind. What reality is apart from
this apparent world is forever beyond the scope and power of
the human intellect.
Kant thus believes he has provided for a revolution in
philosophy similar to the Copernican revolution in astronomy.
He has introduced a new method into philosophy, the trans-
cendental method, which for the first time, he believes,
criticizes philosophical methods as such. Just as Copernicus
explained the apparent motions of the stars as due to the
motion of earthly observers, so Kant explains the apparent
character of reality as due to the mind of the knower. 9 An
exposition of the precise nature of this new method shall be
attempted, in part, in the next section.
9Ibid .
.
p. 75.
7B. The Kantian Doctrine of Experience
1. Introduction .
Kant’s major work, The Critique of Pure itenann
,
lays a
groundwork for his new transcendental science. Here he is
concerned with our ways of knowing objects so far as that is
possible a priori. Kant begins with dividing the mind into
three major divisions, sensibility, understanding, and reason
xhese modes of the mind’s way of knowing resemble the
empiricist’s division of ideas into simple and complex. In
the realm of simple ideas or sensibility the mind is passive.
However, diverging from the empiricists, Kant regards this
passivity as applying only to the matter of experience. In
the realm of the understanding, the mind is active in
conceiving objects of sense. Each realm contributes an a
priori element to knowledge. That part of the "Critique"
which deals with the a priori element contributed by sense is
called the "Transcendental Aesthetic." In Kant's words:
The science of all principles of a priori sensibility
I call "transcendental aesthetic." There must be
such a science forming the first part of the transcen-
dental doctrine of the elements, in distinction from
that part which deals with the principles of pure
thought, and which is called "transcendental logic.” 10
Such a division of the human faculty of knowing is seen
to be an abstraction. In dealing with the sensibility itself
the "aesthetic" must be understood as a provisional and
10 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason . Translated by
Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan and Co., 1929), p. 66.
(Hereafter referred to as CPR.)
8incomplete account of knowledge of sensibility. It is widely
believed, by Paton 11 for example, that Kant believed one could
only fully understand his rational psychology after the
complete "critique" was properly understood. Such a division,
therefore, is an abstraction, but one which must be made so
that certain elements of the mind rnay be properly isolated
for analysis. Thus, Kant writes:
In the transcendental aesthetic we shall, therefore,
first "isolate" sensibility, by taking away from it
everything which the understanding thinks through its
concepts, so that nothing may be left save empirical
intuition. Secondly, we shall also separate off from
it everything which belongs to sensation, so that
nothing may remain save pure intuition and the mere
form of appearance, which is all sensibility can supply
a priori. 12
It is important to understand what Kant means by "pure
intuitions." A pure intuition is the form as distinct from
the matter of sensibility. Kant believes there are two such
forms or pure intuitions, namely, space and time. This is
expressed by him as follows:
I term all representations pure (in the transcendental
sense) in which there is nothing which belongs to
sensation. The pure form of sensible intuitions in
general, in which all the manifold of intuition is
intuited in certain relations, must be found in the
mind a priori. This pure form of sensibility may
also Itself be called pure intuition. If, then, I
take away from the representation of a body that
which the understanding thinks in regard to it,
substance, force, divisibility, etc., and likewise
what belongs to sensation, impenetrability, hardness,
color, etc., something still remains over from this
empirical intuition, which, even without any actual
^Paton, op. cit .. p. 93*
12CPH, p. 66.
9object of the senses or of sensation, exists in the
mind a priori as a mere form of sensibility .13
Thus, it is found that there are two pure forms of sensible
intuition serving as principles of a priori knowledge, namely,
space and time. To Kant's consideration of these we shall
now proceed.
2. The Metaphysical Exposition
.
Kant maintains that space is a pure intuition constituting
outer sense, a property of the mind through which objects are
understood as outside us. Analogously, time is believed to
be a pure intuition constituting inner sense, by means of
which the mind "intuits itself and its inner states," 1^ in
which things are represented as related in time. In his
"metaphysical exposition," Kant endeavors to prove these
points. He presents us with five arguments concerning space
and five concerning time. Because of the great similarity
and repetition of his arguments for space and for time, they
will here be combined and presented in an abbreviated fashion.
Firstly, Kant hopes to prove that space and time are not
empirical concepts. As such, neither space nor time can be
derived from experience. His proof proceeds as follows:
Space is not an empirical concept which has been
derived from outer experiences. For in order that
certain sensations be referred to something outside
me (that is to something in another region of space
from that in which I find myself), and similarly, in
order that I may be able to present them as outside
*-3ibid
.
,
p. 67.
l4Ibid.
10
and alongside one another, and accordingly as notonly different but as in different
,.laces, ?he
representation of space must be presupposed. The
representation of space cannot, therefore, be
empirically obtained from the relations of outer
appearance. On the contrary, this outer experienceis itself possible at all only through that
representation . 15
ihus, to know things as outside the mind and related to each
other is not really to know them as in different places, that
is, dinerent parts of space. The particular spatial relations
in which sensa are given cannot be reduced to mere qualitative
dif ferences • Space must in fact be presupposed as a condition
of such relations. A similar argument follows for time.
for an example, an empirical concept such as "elephant-
ness" is presented all at once, in its entirety, by way of
one elephant as experienced. But neither space nor time can
be an empirical concept for neither all space nor all time is
ever given in its entirety in experience. We experience
only parts of space, although we know that this particular
space is part of the whole of space. But the whole of space
is never given in experience. Therefore space, and. likewise
time, are not empirical concepts.
Secondly, Kant shows that space and time are different
from sensations such as colors, sounds, etc. They are
different, he maintains, because one can think an object
without its color, sound, weight, etc., but one cannot think
away its spatiality and temporality. Of this Kant writes:
Space is a necessary a priori representation, which
15 Ibid
. ,
p. 68.
11
underlies all outer intuitions. We can never
represent to ourselves the absence of space,
though we can quite well think it as empty of
objects
. It roust therefore be regarded as the
condition of the possibility of appearances, and
not as a determination dependent upon them. It
is an a priori representation, which necessarily
underlies outer appearances . lo
Space is therefore, according to Kant, an a priori pure
intuition and necessary to all outer awareness, as time is
of inner awareness. Color, hardness, etc., are not necessary
for our awareness of an object of knowledge, but spatiality
and temporality are.
Thirdly, Kant argues, space and time are not discursive
general concepts, but pure intuitions. 1 ? To have a discursive
concept, one must be able to contrast such a concept with
others. However, all objects are In space and in time. There
is no way to compare or contrast spat io temporal experience
with non-spatiotemporal experience since the latter is never
given to us in sensation. In other words, a discursive
concept contains the common marks of different individual
objects. An intuition, however, is a single idea, an idea of
a single object. For example, I conceive circularity, but I
intuit this particular circle. It is therefore evident, Kant
believes, that space and time are not discursive concepts but
pure intuitions. This must be so because, he adds,
. .
.
geometrical propositions, that, for instance,
in a triangle two sides together are greater than a
third, can never be derived from the general concepts
l6 Ibid.
1 ?Ibid .
.
p. 69.
12
of line and triangle (by concepts alone).
In summation, space and time are pure a priori intuitions
oecause of the oneness of space and of time. Different spaces
are all part of one space, different times all part of one
time, opace and time are, therefore, one and individual and
as such are intuitions and not concepts. Moreover, different
spaces must be thought of as within one all-embracing space.
In fact, Kant believes, different spaces are known as the
limitations of the one all-embracing space, which must be
presupposed from the start. Space is a whole and time is a
whole and, therefore, is logically prior to its parts. It
seoms evident to Kant to conclude that one pure intuition of
space and one pure intuition of time must underlie all
conceptions of space and time.
Perhaos the Kantian view of space and time can best be
understood within the context of other theories prevalent in
Kant's day. By far, two theories of space and time exerted
the greatest influence upon Kant's contemporaries. These v. ere
the "absolute" theory of Newton and the "relative" theory of
Leibniz. Newton conceived of an absolute space and an absolute
time existing in reality apart from objects temporally and
spatially related. 1 ^ As such, space and time were "receptacles.
Kant, however, rejects the Newtonian theory on the grounds
that space and time would be two eternal, infinite, nonentities
l?Cf. E. A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern
Science (Garden City, N. Y. : Doubleday Inc.
,
193^ ) , p. 244.
13
2o
or "un things" which exist but are rot real. They exist, he
explains, merely in order to receive anything real into
themselves. Such a view, he believes, must be inconsistent,
for it is metaphysically untenable. 21
On the other hand, Leibniz conceived space and time as
relations of appearances; relations abstracted from real
22things in experience. ilore simply expressed, space and
time are characteristics of things. Kant's doctrine may be
seen as mainly directed against Leibniz. If Leibniz is right,
i^ant maintains, space and time would be a mere generalization
from experience. J ouch a belief was attacked and disproved
in his metapt cr.l exposition. He adds that even if space
and time were characteristics of things-in-themselves we could
never obtain the certainty that we do in mathematics, nor
could we assert the theorems of geometry as holding for the
real world.
These two conflicting theories, then, presented Kant with
hypotheses which he considered untenable. If space and time
existed by themselves then metaphysical difficulties arise.
On the other hand, if space and time are properties of things
then the certainty of mathematics is not assured. It is not,
therefore, surprising that Kant was led to the belief that
2ll Paton, op. cit .. p. 132.
21CPii, p. 80.
22cf. C. B. Garnett, The Kantian Philosophy of opace (Hew
York: Columbia University Press
,
1939 ) , P • 99
.
2 3cph, p. 71.
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space and time are universal subjective forms of sensibility
allowing for the certainty of mathematics and the objectivity
of science.
Thus, space and time are not realities or things existing
in themselves, nor are they qualities or relations of things
existing as such. We must accept the fact, Kant believes,
that space and time are pure forms of intuition, subjective
mental forms, pure intuitions which must be presupposed in
order for an object to be known to the inquiring mind. We
cannot think or perceive things without space and time, but
we can think without objects. Hence, space and time are
necessary preconditions of phenomena and, thus, are necessary
a priori. Such a classification provides geometry with a
base and explains and defends its certainty. Unless space
were a pure intuition, geometrical judgements could not have
the necessity and universality which they, as a matter of
fact, have.
3. Noumena and Phenomena
.
Assuming the validity of Kant's arguments for the
a priori nature of space and time, we are left with a novel
theory of perception. According to Kant, the manifold of
sensation is objectified—becomes possible objects of
experience—through the mind's application of the pure forms
of space and time. In perception, then, the manifold of
sensation is unified and synthesized through the application
15
of the a priori pure forms of space and time. 24 In other
words, human perception must be spat iotemporal. What objects
are apart from their spatiotemporal framework is forever
unknowable. The manifold of sensation, then, being not yet
amenable to human awareness, constitutes a realm of "things-
in-themselvQB
,
' or objects of which we know nothing other
than the fact that they are the matter of sensation and are
somehow causally related to perception. 2 ^ Such things-in-
themselves, when arranged spatiotemporally by the human
a priori forms of space and time, become known to us within
this spatiotemporal system. We, then, live in a world of
appearances, a world in which reality is automatically
throttled spatiotemporally by the human mind. What things-in-
themselves are, what reality is in itself, for humans, is a
moot question.
However, Kant does not mean that we, as humans, live in
a world of illusion. To clarify this position, it would,
perhaps, be best to revert to Kant’s own formulation:
When I say that the intuition of outer objects and
the self-intuition of the mind alike represent the
objects and the mind, in space and time, as they
affect our senses, that is, as they appear, I do not
mean to say that these objects are a mere illusion.
For in an appearance the objects, nay even the
properties that we ascribe to them, are always
regarded as something actually given. Since, however,
in the relation of the given object to the subject,
this object of appearance is to be distinguished from
itself as object in itself. Thus, when I maintain that
2 4
Ibid .
.
p. 87.
2
^Cf. Oscar W. Hiller, The Kantian Thin,g-in-It self or
The Creative Hind (New York : Philosophical Library, 195^ ) » P* 17f.
16
t
??u
qU
f} 1 ,ty of space and of time, in conformitywith which, as a condition of their existence,"
I posit both bodies and my own soul, lies in my
mode of intuition and not in those objects them-
selves, I am not saying that bodies merely seem
to be outside me, or that my soul only seems to begiven in self-consciousness. It would be my own
fault, if out of that which I ought to reckon as
appearance, I made mere illusion. That does notfollow as a consequence of our principle of theideality of all our sensible intuitions
—
quite the
contrary. It i3 only if we ascribe objective
reality to those forms of representation, that it
becomes impossible for us to prevent everything
being thereby transformed into mere illusion. 26
Thus, the realm of phenomena, possible objects of
experience, is not illusion but a world of appearances. It
is apart from the noumenal world of things-in-themselves only
because the nature of the human mind is such that it must
first spatiotemporalize this manifold before it can experience.
The phenomenal world is therefore a relative reality and
questions of ultimate reality are not pertinent to discourse
about it.
Such a view, while returning physics and mathematics to
the vaunted position they had prior to the skeptical philosophy
of Hume, serves also to greatly limit metaphysics. Kant's
position brings rationalism and empiricism together to give
science a base--but at the expense of eliminating metaphysics
as a supersensible science. Metaphysics would be possible
only if it concerned itself with the world of appearances,
the phenomenal world, the world as spatlotemporally ordered
by the mind. Synthetic a priori propositions bear fruit only
26CPE
, p. 88.
17
as applied to objects of possible experience. Thus, as
science is saved by Kant's philosophy, metaphysics is
eliminated. we are forced to give up the metaphysics of the
past and substitute for it a metaphysics of experience. This
is so because we can have a priori knowledge of things only in
so tar as what we know of them is impressed by the nature of
our own minds. Kant’s method introduces a new kind of
metaphysics, one which decides its own boundaries. Kant
professes to give us certain knowledge within the limits of
experience. If we seek to go beyond such limits we must do
so not by knowledge but by faith.
Kant's philosophy from the start, in the realm of
sensation, indicates the limitations upon our ability to
attain knowledge. However, his exposition here is not
complete. There is still the role of the understanding to
be investigated.
18
C. Tlie Understanding
1, Introduction
.
In the previous section, Kant's theory of perception was
discussed with an eye toward his completed theory of knowledge.
It is seen, however, that a theory of perception is not enough
to explain knowledge. Mere unrelated and disconnected
percepts, mere perception of objects in space and time would
not yield knowledge. For example, the mere perception of fire
followed by the perception of charcoal is not the same as
knowing that fire consumes wood. Only by connecting two
experiences in thought in a certain way can one form the
judgement that fire is the cause of the consumption of wood.
The objects given to us in perception must be connected,
related, conceived, or thought for knowledge to come about.
The understanding, then, allows us to think the objects of
sensible intuition. Thus, without sensibility no object
would be given, but without the understanding, no object
would be thought.
To make our percepts intelligible, we must first bring
them under concepts. The understanding by itself cannot
intuit or perceive anything. Analogously, the senses by
themselves cannot think anything. It is solely by their union
that knowledge arises. As Kant says, "Thoughts without
27
content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind."
He continues, "We therefore distinguish the science of the
27Ibid
.
.
p. 93.
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rules of sensibility in general, that is, aesthetic, from the
science of the rules of the understanding in general, that is
* ,.28logic .
'
Kant's account of the functioning of the understanding
and the exposition of these "rules 11 of the understanding are
found in his chapter on "Transcendental Logic." This will
be the subject of the next section.
2. Transcendental Logic and the Categories
.
The understanding has many ways of conceiving, relating,
and connecting percepts. It is Kant's contention that the
general criteria that these powers of conception, relation,
etc., must measure up to, must be a supreme set of concepts.
These criteria of the workings of the understanding Kant calls
29
"pure concepts of the understanding" or "categories." They
are called pure because Kant believes them to be a priori and
not derived from experience.
The understanding, Kant maintains, expresses itself in
judgement. Accordingly, understanding is a faculty of
judgement. It follows, therefore, that the understanding in
conceiving is also judging. Now, to discover the ways of the
understanding, the criteria to which its powers of conceiving
must conform, we must first analyse our judgements as to the
forms in which they appear. Kant believes that one does not
have to search far for these forms of conception. Indeed,
they are already given in the discipline of logic. It .is seen,
28
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then, that in logic, in this case the Aristotelian logic of
Kant’s day, these forms of judgement are exhibited.
fbus, the a priori concepts or pure concepts of the
understanding (categories) can be discovered by referring to
the basic forms of judgement which are already given to us
as the subject matter of formal (Aristotelian) logic. It is
then possible, so Kant believes, to deduce from these forms
of judgement, the categories which act as criteria and set
of rules for all the operations of the understanding. What,
then, are these forms of judgement? Kant says the following
If we abstract from all content of a judgement, and
consider only the mere form of understanding, we find
that the function of thought in judgement can be
brought under four heads, each of which contains three
moments. They may be conveniently expressed in the
following table. 3l
I
Quantity of Judgement
universal
particular
singular
II III
RelationQuality
affirmative categorial
hypothetical
disjunctive
negative
infinite
IV
Modality
problematic
assertive
apodeictic
3 ° Ibid
.
,
p. 96.
^ 1 Ibid
. ,
p. 106.
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V.
rhat has here been given us Is a "clue to the discovering
of all pure concepts of the understanding. Within the
preceding table are to be found the complete logical functions
of all possible judgements as displayed in Aristotelian logic.
Kant believes this list to be complete, as the completeness
of Aristotelian logic was not questioned in his day. But
what of the pure concepts or categories? Kant tells us that
there are exactly the same number of pure concepts of the
understanding which apply a priori to objects of intuition
in general, as have been found logical functions in all
possible judgements, lie argues, then, that these functions
give an exhaustive inventory of the rules and criteria which
govern the workings of the understanding. Thus, the
13
completed categories are:
I
of Quantity
Unity
Plurality
Totality
II III
of Relationof Quality
Reality
Negation
Limitation
of Inherence and Subsistence
of Causality .and Dependence
of Community (reciprocity
between agent and patient)
IV
Modality
Possibility—Impossibility
Existence—Non-existence
Necessity—Contingency
32
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"This then," Kant says, "is the list of all original pure
concepts of synthesis that the understanding contains within
itself a priori. "^4 This list, he believes, is necessarily
complete.
’Jpon analysis of this table of categories, the first
thing that suggests itself is that they fall naturally into
nwo groups, which may be distinguished as the "mathematical"
and 'dynamical" categories. The former are concerned with
objects of perception; that is to say, they express the first
constitution of an object of experience by the synthesis of
elements into individual wholes. For an example, let us apply
the categories of quantity, i.e., unity, plurality, and
totality. By the synthetic activity of thought, elements of
perception, which are presented as a manifold, are combined
under one of these categories. The product is the conscious-
ness of a single object. Thus, before a line can be an
object of thought, the perceptual elements or parts of the
line must be given one after another and combined by thought
into the consciousness of a single line. Thus, these
categories deal with the relation or connection of objects
of experience when they are viewed in themselves or separately.
The dynamical categories, on the other hand, deal with
the relation or connection of objects not taken singly. These
are the categories of relation and modality. The categories
34
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"Cf. Morman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant *3 Critique
of Pure Reason (London: Macmillan and Co. , 1913) , P* 193.
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of relation are those which deal with objects as related to
one another, the category of modality those which deal with
the relation of objects to the understanding.
These categories, then, are the ultimate criteria which
universally and necessarily apply to every thing so far as it
is a thing. As universal and necessary, the categories are
pure a priori. They are imposed by the mind on objects of
possible experience given in sensation, and constitute the
bare forms of judgement, the criteria and rules governing the
function of the understanding. In other words, in order that
an object be known by us, it must first consist of sensible
matter held together by the categories in a necessary
synthetic unity. It is this necessary synthetic unity which
constitutes the universal and necessary character of any and
every object. Hence, a category is a pure concept, a criterion
of the necessary synthetic unity which must occur if we are
to know an object.
The idea of synthesis is most important in Kant. He
explains it as, "the act of putting different representations
together . . . into a unity. Accordingly, a synthesis of
the manifold of sensation is what first gives rise to
knowledge. It gathers elements from the manifold and unites
them to form the concept of an object. The next section will
deal with how such a synthesis takes place.
36 CPH, p. 111.
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1. Transcendental Deduction and the Schematism
.
Having given us an account of the categories or pure
concepts of the understanding, Kant is faced with a pertinent
problem, namely, by what right and by what means do we apply
these mental forms of thought to things? In other words,
what is their objective validity? How do the categories,
independent of experience, apply to objects of experience?
Kant endeavors to attack these problems in his "Transcendental
^eduction." In his words:
Now among the :anifold concepts which form the highly
complicated web of human knowledge, there are some
which are marked out for pure a priori employment, in
complete independence of all experience; and their
right to be so employed always demands a deduction.
For since empirical truths do not suffice to justify
this kind of employment, we are faced by the problem
of how these concepts can relate to objects which
they yet do not obtain from any experience. The
explanation of the manner in which concepts can thus
relate a priori to objects I entitle their
transcendental deduction. 3?
Thus, as jurists call the proof of claims in a legal process
a "deduction,’' so a deduction of the categories is needed here.
Kant's deduction consists in showing that without the
categories intelligent activity would not be possible.
Accordingly, there can be no knowledge, no connected world of
experience without a unified or unifying consciousness or
self-consciousness— the synthetic unity of apperception, as
Kant calls it, which operates with these categories. Under-
standing, then, is judgement, the act of bringing together in
37Ibid
.
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one self-consciousness (unity of apperception) the manifold
of perception. 38
The connectedness of objects, Kant believes, is due
entirely to the human intellect. Only in becoming conscious
of one's own identity, that one stands apart from the
manifold of objects, is one able to become aware of objects
proper and their connectedness, as distinct from isolated
Humean impressions. Kant maintains that it must be possible
for "I think” to accompany all representations; for only in
so far as one can unite a manifold of given representations
into one consciousness, is it possible for one to represent
to oneself the identity of consciousness in those representa-
tions. In other words, awareness of self is only possible
under the presupposition of a certain synthetic unity, namely,
the synthetic unity of apperception. The power of combination
does not lie in objects but is an affair of the understanding,
the faculty of combining a priori, of bringing the manifold
of given representations under the unity of apperception.
Thus, the unity of apperception necessarily involves a
synthesis. The reality of the thinking self consists solely
in its ability to connect together a variety of presentations
,
and while connecting them become aware of its own unity and
that of the sensible object which is being subjected to
judgement
.
39
3®There are other syntheses indicated by Kant, as, for
example, the synthesis of the imagination. However, because
they are of minor importance and for the sake of brevity, I
have not here included a discussion of them.
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^hus, if human beings are to become aware of anything
given in sense, it is necessary that, first of all, they
synthesize their representations, and secondly, that they
become conscious of the fact that they themselves are the
source of this synthesis.
irhat has been presented here is a simplification of a
vastly complicated forest of Kantian terminology. As I
believe no greater depth of exposition is required for our
purposes, suf : ice it to say that so simple an act as the
perception of freezing water would be impossible unless the
mind comprehends two states and connects them in a single act
of thought. The same synthetic unity of apperception which
is necessary in order that we may have judgement is necessary
in order that we have particular perception, in order that
we may apprehend.
We know, then, that the mind orders the manifold. It is
possible that we can know these a priori forms by which the
universe is ordered. Thus, we know that the perceived world
will always be connected to us in certain intelligible ways,
that our experiences will always be spatiotemporal and
connected as substance and accident, cause and effect,
reciprocity, etc. We cannot go wrong, therefore, in applying
the c tegories to the world of things.
It is seen, however, that Kant still has the problem of
explaining in detail how the categories, which are intellectual,
are applied to percepts, to sensible phenomena. Pure concepts
and sensory phenomena are completely dissimilar or, according
27
to Kant, "heterogeneous.”40 The question Kant is to deal
with is how concepts and percepts may be "homogeneous." He
says, "In all subsuraptions of an object under a concept, the
representation of the object must be homogeneous with the
concept. 1 How this is done comprises the contents of
Kant’s chapter on "Schematism."
In order to solve this problem, Kant believes there must
be some third thing which is homogeneous on the one hand with
the category, and on the other with percepts. 42 This third
something must function in a mediating capacity. In addition,
it must be pure (a priori) and at the same time sensuous if
it is to apply equally to both realms. "Such a representation,"
Kant maintains, "is the 'Transcendental Schema'." 4^ It is
this schema, then, which serves as a mediator between
concepts and percepts.
What is the nature of this mediating something, this
schema? Kant believes it to be our pure intuition of time,
our intuition of inner sense serving a dual role. Since time
is the immediate determining or conditioning agent of inner
sense, all our experiences are ordered by us in time, that
is, they take place in time. Hence, if the intellect and
sensibility are to be related at all, Kant believes, they
must be related by means of our pure temporal intuition. In
40
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addition, the a priori particular^ of time fills the
conditions of being both a priori and sensuous. Thus,
concepts are imagined, connected, and related in time. In so
c-oing the intellect visualizes concepts in some temporal
relation and thereby relates them.
To prove this contention, Kant has recourse to showing
^ OVJ
» through tine, the intellect affects sensibility. The
intellect successively adds one to one, or considers time as
a series of homogeneous moments. This operation of numbering,
adding one to one, is the schema of the category of quantity,
the category as expressed in the form of time. Analogously,
the intellect comprehends reality in time. The content of the
real is that which remains in the midst of change. In this
way, the category of substance is operative in the intellect.
In the same way, the category of causality is understood as
a connection in time, etc. Thus, Kant shows, with some
degree of difficulty, how time mediates between concept and
percept. Kant sums up his argument as follows:
We find that the schema of each category contains and
makes capable of representation only a determination
of time. The schema of magnitude is the generation
(synthesis) of time itself in the successive apprehen-
sion of an object. The schema of quality is the
synthesis of sensation or perception with the repre-
sentation of time; it is the filling of time. The
schema of relation is the connection of perceptions
with one another at all times according to a rule of
time determination. Finally, the schema of modality
and of its categories in time itself is the correlate
of the determination whether and how an object belongs
in time. The schema are thus nothing but a priori
Of. S. Korner, Kant (Middlesex, G. 3. : Penguin Books
Ltd., I960), p. 30.
determinations of time.
2^
It is seen, then, that the schema of the pure concepts of
the understanding are the true and sole conditions under
which these concepts relate two objects and so possess
significance . " In addition, these concepts can have no
other possible employment than the empirical. "They," Kant
writes, "serve only to subordinate appearances to universal
rules of synthesis, and thus, to fit them for thoroughgoing
connections in one experience." 2*''7
All our knowledge, therefore, must fall within the
bounds of possible experience. The categories may be applied
only to the manifold of sensation as spatiotemporally ordered
by the mind prior to cognition. This spatiotemporally
ordered manifold constitutes the bounds within which the
categories are applicable.
4. Phenomena and .Science.
As has been indicated, we cannot transcend our experience
and have a priori knowledge of the supersensible. Such a
knowledge would be a knowledge of things-in-themselves
,
of
things as they are apart from their mode of presentation,
apart from our necessary spatiotemporalizing of them. Thus,
things-in-themselves cannot be perceived by the senses; only
30
the way they appear to consciousness is knowable. Moreover,
they cannot be intuited by the intellect for there is no
intellectual intuition. It is seen, then, that if we apply
any of the categories to a thing-in-itself
,
we cannot justify
their application.
We can
> however
,
think such a thing-in-itself
.
48
We
may speak of it as that which lies outside of sense
perception, that which is non-spatiotemporal
. No category,
however, may be applied to it, because we have no means of
knowing if anything corresponding to it exists. We could,
for example, never know whether anything existed corresponding
to the notion of substance if sense-perception did not
furnish us with a case in which the category can be applied.
However, we have no perception of a thing-in-itself. The
thing-in-itself, then, is a limiting concept, it presents
a limit to knowledge. Only the phenomenal, the world of
appearances, is intelligible to man. What lies beyond it,
the noumenal, lies forever beyond the reach of human knowledge.
As such, it follows that we cannot have universal and
necessary a priori knowledge of anything non-perceivable.
Hence, we cannot have a metaphysics that transcends experience,
a metaphysics of the noumenal realm. Knowledge of God, free
will, and immortality lies outside the realm of possible
objective knowledge, outside the world of phenomena.
Kant believes he has shown that mathematics and geometry
48
See Kant's section on the "Refutation of Idealism,"
CPR, p. 244.
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owe their necessity to our pure Intuitions of space and time.
Specifically, geometry is thought to be based on the a priori
form of space and arithmetic on the notion or number which
expresses a priori our pure intuition of time. In addition,
natural science is seen to rest upon the categories. Cause
and effect, reciprocity, substance and quality, etc., the
judgements of science, are given a base not in sense-
perception, but in- the mind.
•»
re can thus have universal and necessary knowledge in
mathematics and in physics, but it is a knowlege of phenomena
only, knowledge only of the form and arrangement of phenomena.
Causal laws as synthetic a priori judgements bear fruit as
applied to the realm of possible experience, the realm of
spatiotemporally preconditioned sensation. The validity of
science is believed restored from Hume's devastating attacks,
but its application must be confined within the conditioned
phenomenal world. Thus, scientific thought can again
penetrate our passing sensations to a common objective world
of substances in interaction, but this world is a world as
it appears to human minds and not a world of things as they
are in themselves.
32
0. In Retrospect
What has here been presented is a brief exposition of
Kant's transcendental method and his philosophical beliefs.
This discussion has proceeded as an account of Kant's
philosophy which is pertinent to the matter at hand, namely,
the development of neo-Kantian thought and the philosophy of
language in general. The sections on the "Analogies "Antinomies ,"
and the 'Transcendental Dialectic?' were omitted as irrelevant
to the development of a context from which the main thesis of
this paper may proceed.
No matter what one's philosophical beliefs may be, it
must be agreed that Kant's contribution to philosophy was a
major one. To Kant, what reality is to the inquirer depends
upon the categories of thought inherent in the inquiring
mind. What exists apart from these mental operations is
forever hidden from cognition. Reality, then, is arranged or
manipulated by man's thought processes so that what he may
know relies solely upon what he may think. Man shapes and
forms the barest real according to his methods of knowing.
Metaphorically speaking, his mind casts mental beams of light
toward the darkness of unknown reality. As such, the mind
illuminates a circle of inquiry. However, what is observed
is as much a function of the illuminating light as it is a
function of the illuminated. The sheer power of these ideas
secure Kant's position as a philosopher of the first order.
However, Kant's transcendental system, the system by
which he believes the previous ideas are rendered explicit,
33
is by no means straightforward or consistently presented. in
fact, many believe much of his philosophy is so obscure as
to be almost unintelligible. The intricate workings of his
system have, since its inception, been severely criticized by
knowledgeable men of all disciplines.
No doubt
> some of Kant's obscurities can be understood
in terms of the revolutionary nature of his thought. Perhaps
this explains why his terminology and general manner of
presentation is difficult to master. Once, however, a clear
meaning is abstracted from Kantian language—and this is
often a very difficult task--there are many who, although
agreeing with Kant in principle, are dissatisfied with the
internal workings of his system. There are others, Whitehead"’ 0
51and Russell for example, who are completely at odds with
the basic tenets of his belief.
Kant's critics were and are quite numerous. Some of these
criticisms will be brought forward shortly. For the present,
however, suffice it to say these criticisms did not force the
total abandonment of the Kantian first principles. His basic
beliefs proved themselves to be important philosophical
discoveries. These criticisms served only as impetus for his
49
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^°A. N. Whitehead calls his philosophical beliefs "an
inversion of Kantian philosophy" in his "Process and Reality,"
Alfred North Whitehead—An Anthology , edited by Northrop and
Gross (New York: Macmillan Co., 19oi), p. 731f.
^Cf. Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy
(New York: Simon and Schuster” 19^5)
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followers to improve upon his system. Kant's successors,
called neo-Kantians, hoped to profit by Kant's mistakes and
at the same time preserve the basic principles of his
"Copern ican Revolution. " Such a view is stated by the neo-
Kantian H. U. Cassirer as fellows:
... I also happen to hold what at present is a most
unfashionable opinion, namely, that the errors
committed by the great philosophers are, generally
speaking, not only more interesting but more fruitful
than the truths propounded by lesser men. 52
The task set before the followers of Kant was, then, to
present the Kantian hypothesis as a consistent and coherent
whole. While these men endeavored to achieve this goal,
philosophy witnessed the birth of a new philosophical pursuit,
namely, linguistic philosophy or the philosophy of language.
Neo-Kant ians soon found that the key to the remaking of Kant's
philosophy lay in the orinciples of linguistic philosophy.
Let us, then, embark upon an investigation of how criticisms
of the Kantian system resulted in its reformulation by neo-
Kantians and analytic philosophers in regard to the philosophy
of language.
52
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PART TWO
CRITICISM OF KANT AND NEO-KANTIAN THOUGHT
II.» CRITICISM
. OF KANT AND IIEP-KANTIAN THOUGHT
A. Space and Time
1. Geometry.
Having outlined the main points of Kant's philosophy, I
shall now turn to the exposition of some of the criticism his
contention has engendered. Thus, with an eye toward subsequent
neo-Kan tian reformulations of the Kantian hypothesis, let us
proceed with shedding some light on some of the difficulties
both inherent in and productive of Kant's philosophy.
As has been pointed out, Kant placed great importance in
his belief that the certainty of geometry is constituted by
our pure intuition of space. In fact, unless we possess such
a pure intuition, geometry would be impossible. In Kant's
day, the only geometry known was Euclidian geometry. 1 It was
believed to be true of the empirical world. Indeed, Kant's
system can be seen as directed toward the conservation of this
belief; for he hoped his philosophy would successfully
account for its certainty in itself and its application.
Kant died just twenty years before Hiemann developed the
first non-Euclidian geometry. Unfortunately for Kant, the
1
It should be stressed that for Kant space means Euclidian
space, and in particular, Euclidian geometry. For an account
of this see Gottfried Martin, Kant's Metaphysics and Theory of
Science (Manchester, G. B. : Manchester Press, 19^1), p. 4o.
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development of modern mathematics and of modern mathematical
theory casts grave doubts upon his assumptions in regard to
geometry. Of this, one of his commentators has written the
following:
According to the
so high a degree
it has ceased to
quantity, and a
that formal logi
mathematics, are
and this whole i
method .
2
modern view, mathematics now aims at
of generality and abstractness thathave any essential connection with
fortiori with space. The result is
c, mathematical theory, and pure
all merged into an indivisible whole;
s described as pursuing an analytical’
In other words, modern mathematics and geometry owe their
certainty not to a pure intuition of space, but to their being
analytic systems which proceed solely by deductive processes
from fixed axioms and postulates. Hence, one does not need a
pure spatial intuition to explain such certainty. This
development taken alone does not disprove the Kantian hypothesis
for perhaps intuition of space can explain the Euclidian
geometry of Kant’s contemporaries, but when understood in the
light of modern physics grave difficulties arise.
Modern relativity physics has provided for some startling
discoveries affecting cosmological theories of space and
time. In reference to Kantian philosophy, its most pertinent
development was in the realm of geometry. Relativity physics
has overthrown the old belief that Euclidian geometry is the
sole geometry that is true of the world. In its place has
been postulated the theory of what Reichenbach calls, "the
2
H. J. Paton, Kant’s Metaphysics of Experience (London:
Allen and Unwin Ltd., and New York: Macmillan and Go., 1951),
p. 155.
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relativity of geometries." 3 He states the following:
The theory of relativity shows that space and timeare neither ideal objects nor formal forms of ordernecessary for the human mind.**'
In the same vein, Paton writes the followinr:
Modern theory ... denies that any one kind of
space is more fundamental than any other. Above
all
,
it denies that Euclidian space is more real orfundamental than any other.
5
Thus, there are as many "spaces" as there are geometries. It
is not surprising that Einstein chose a non-Buclidian space
in which to describe certain spatial relationships. It is now
seen that the world must no longer fit a geometry, but there
is a question as to what geometry fits a certain empirical
situation
.
That, then, are the implications for Kantianism? It is
understood that there are no longer any grounds for assuming
that Euclidian geometry is true of the world, nor can one
maintain that the certainty of geometry must depend upon a
pure intuition of space. But what of visualization' If
there is a complete relativity of geometry and one geometry
is as good as the next, why not assume Euclidian geometry as
being true of the world of experience; for it is the only
geometry capable of being visualized.
a
vEor an enlightening discussion of this theory see Hans
Reichenbach, The Philosophy of Space and Time (New York: Dover,
1958), p. 30f.
h,
Hans Reichenbach, "Philosophical Significance of the
Theory of Relativity," Headim^s in the Philosophy of Science ,
edited by Philip Wiener (New York: Scribner's and Sons, 1953),
p. 68
.
3Paton
,
op. cit .
.
p. 161.
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This view, however, is seen to include a faulty premise.
It is now widely held that non-Euclid ian geometry can be and
is visualized. Many geometers believe that they can do this.
Many laymen, in fact, perceive "non-Euclid ianly” every day. 6
It is thus believed that a non-Euclid ian geometry can be
visualized with practice. 17 ,f e have now no other choice but
to agree with Reichenbach when he states: "There is no
defense of Kantianism."^
If Kant's theory is to be maintained in a modern forn^ we
should have to hold that there must be as many pure Intuitions
of space as there are geometries; that there must be pure
intuitions of space-time in the light of which all different
geometries are intelligible. This, however, seems to stray
far from Kant's original intentions. Furthermore, it is
supposed that such a doctrine, in the hands of a competent
scientist, can be reduced to meaninglessness. Kant's purpose
was to justify and account for the strange pervasiveness and
comprehensiveness of Euclidian geometry. In this context,
perhaps Kant's greatest genius can be found in his ability to
recognize the problem of explaining this pervasiveness.
A
Take, for example, one's perception of on-coming auto-
mobiles as viewed in a curved side-view mirror. After one
becomes acclimated to the mirror's "distortions," it is simple
to judge spatial relations.
?The argument for visualization is stronger than 1 have
here indicated. Nevertheless, Reichenbach makes quick work of
it in The Philosophy of Space and Time
, p. 44f.
®Hans Reichenbach, "Philosophical Significance of the
Theory of Relativity," Readings in the Philosophy of Science .
p. 66.
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As has been seen, Kant’s explanation of space and
geometry is rendered practically untenable in the light of
the recent developments in physics and mathematics. The
problem posed to Kant's followers was then to explain the
preeminence of euclidian geometry in perception and thought
without recourse to a priori intuitions. Why is it, for
example, objects are arranged by us in a Euclidian fashion?
Why do we find non-Euclid ian geometry so difficult to
conceive? It has been pointed out by many, Frank^ in
particular
,
that we are trained solely in Euclidian geometry
in schools. It is to be noticed, however, that those without
formal training have the same difficulty of visualization.
There clearly must be an overall factor underlying spatial
perception and thought that provides for the Dervasiveness
of Euclidian geometry. Neo-Kantians and others soon found
that the "condi tioning power" of the edifice of language could
be this sought after factor. This, however, will be discussed
in a subsequent chapter.
2. Space-Time .
In the section on the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant
holds that space and time are the forms by which the manifold,
of sense becomes known to us. Moreover, it is believed that
space by itself and time by itself are the conditioning agents
^Philipp Frank, Philosophy of Science (Englewood Cliffs,
N. J.: Prentiss-Hall
,
1958)
,
p. 52 .
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of such sensual knowledge. 10 At the same time, Kant maintains
that space is the form of outer experience and time is the
form of inner experience. Of this Paton remarks:
If
uF
a
2
e
?
nd tin1e 3re t0 serve Kant’s purposes they
ought to be universal and necessary conditions of
~~ "" i^tven to sense. It can hardly be main-tained chat t^ant has shown space to be such a
condition. •.Space is said to be the condition of
outer experience and of outer intuition. This
assertion definitely restricts or limits the exnerience
of which space is said to be the limit.
In addition, Paton points out that, "similar difficulties
might be raised in rsgard to time." 12 Time is the form of
inner sense only
,
that is, of the intuition of ourselves and
of our inner states, it, therefore, cannot be a determinant
of outer experience.
How are we to render Kant’s account of space and time
consistent in the light of Paton's arguments? There are
places where Kant does not seem wholly unaware of this
difficulty. For example;
Time and space are, therefore, two sources of
knowledge from which bodies of a priori synthetic
knowledge can be derived. Time and space, taken
together, are the pure forms of all sensible
intuition and so are what make synthetic a priori
propositions possible.
^
It seems, then, for a consistent Kantian doctrine we must
^Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Season , translated by
Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan and Co., 1929), p. 66.
(Hereafter referred to as CPR.
)
^Ipaton, op. clt .. p. 146.
•^ Ibld
.
.
p. 148.
13era
, p. 80.
41
understand space and time as conditions of all objects given
to sense and must conclude that neither space by itself or
time by itself is a sufficient condition for all sensual
knowledge; that only their concatenation, space- time, can
serve this function. Paton reaches a similar conclusion:
1 o make lant's doctrine satisfactory we must
recognize that space and time are ultimately bound
up togetner, and that space is the mediate
condition of inner, as well as the immediate
condition of outer, experience. 14
Analogously, time is considered the mediate condition of
outer experience and the immediate condition of inner sense.
fhus, within the Kantian system, togetherness of space and
time can be understood in terms of their mediate and immediate
powers of conditioning or ordering the manifold of sensation.
j.his in terpre ta t ion can be seen to vary somewhat from Kant's
exposition. However, it is this idea of the togetherness of
space and time which served as a point of departure for
improvements upon the Kantian system.
Bertrand Russell, one of Kant's most outspoken critics,
finds great fault with the Transcendental Aesthetic. Such a
view of space and time, he believes, is not consistent with
the assumptions of not only relativity physics, but all
physics. As such, the Kantian view is seen to be lacking in
utility. Assuming, as Kant does, that percepts are caused by
things-in-themselves
,
Russell presents us with the following
argument
:
Ik
Paton, op. cit
., p. 99.
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If we adopt the view, which is taken for errantphysics, that our percepts have external causes whichftre, in some sense, material, we are led to thpconclusion that all the actual qualities w, ’ n .
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Thus, says Russell:
e .ir.ve, on this view, two spaces, one subjective andone oojective
,
one known in experience and one merelyinferred. But there is no difference in this respect
oetween space and other aspects of perception, such
as colors and sounds. All alike, in their subjectiveforms, are known empirically; all alike, in their
oo jective forms
,
are inferred by means of a maxim as
to causation. There is no reason whatever for regard-ing our knowledge of space as in any way different from
our knowledge of color and sound and smell. 16
With regards to time, he continues:
. . . if we adhere to the belief in unperceived causes
of percepts, the objective time must be identical with
the subjective time.
. . . take for example such a case
as the following: You hear a man speak, you answer him
and he hears you. His speaking, and his hearing of
your reply, are both, so far as you are concerned, in
the unperceived world; and in that world the former
precedes the latter. Moreover, his speaking precedes
your hearing in the objective world of physics; your
hearing precedes your reply in the subjective world of
percepts; and your reply precedes his hearing in the
objective world of physics. It is clear that the
relation "precedes" must be the same in all these
^Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New
York: 3imon and Schuster
,
1945)
, p. 717 .
l6 Ibid.
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propositions. While, therefore, there is an importantsense in which perceptual space is subjective there ‘i*no sense in which perceptual time is subjective. 1?
I believe Russell has here presented a very cogent
argument. Why should we regard our knowledge of space, on
the perceptual level, any differently from our knowledge of
smell and taste? Furthermore, how, according to this argument,
may we say that perceptual time is subjective? Yet, Russell
does not seem to be aware of the problem that Kant was trying
so eagerly to solve; namely, how can one account for the
peculiar pervasiveness of space and time in perception and
conception? Perhaps Russell does not think this to be a
problem at all. Nevertheless, there is much substance to his
argument.
Perhaps Bussell’s most telling criticism attacks the
Kantian theory as it stands. Of the metaphysical arguments
concerning space and time he says:
The image which arises in one's mind is that of a
cloak-room attendant who hangs different cloaks on
different pegs; the pegs must already exist, but the
attendant's subjectivity arranges the coats.
. . .
There is here, as throughout Kant's theory of the
subjectivity of space and time, a difficulty which
he seems to have never felt. What induces me to
arrange objects of perception as I do rather than
otherwise? Why, for instance, do I always see
people's eyes above their mouths and not below them?18
Thus, Kant's arguments tell us that objects of perception
must be arranged spatiotemporally
,
but this does not explain
17Ibid.
18Ibid
.
.
p. 714.
why certain objects are spatially related to other objects
the way they are. Russell continues,
Kant holds that the mind orders the raw material ofsensation, but never thinks it necessary to say 'whyit orders as it does and not otherwise* i-9
Kant's system, then, does not explain the positioning of
particulars (particular objects) in space and time. Clearly
there is nothing in the matter of sensation, in things-in-
themselves, which corresponds to the spatial arrangement of
objects oi perception. This can be seen as only a restatement
of the Leibnizian position which Kant believes he has dis-
proved in his metaphysical exposition of space and time.
'^hat is there, then, in the form of sensation, in space as a
pure intuition, which can explain this phenomenon? Clearly,
if Kant's system is to be consistent, one must account for
the positioning of particulars in space and time. Furthermore,
it must be pointed out why particular objects are positioned
as they are—relative to other objects--and not otherwise.
Such an endeavor must admit amendments to the Kantian system,
must recognize something more basic than pure space and pure
time as ordering agents or forms of sensation and at the same
time account for Kantian space and time. Some modern
philosophers concerned with the problem believe that language
fulfills the role of explaining the peculiar positioning of
particulars and can be seen as underlying Kantian space and
time. An investigation of this claim will be attempted in the
following chapters.
19
Ibid.
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5. The Understanding
For Kant, the understanding is actively engaged in
synthesizing and organizing objects of experience. It does
this by way of a set of rules which act as criteria for all
its operations. These rules are called categories or pure
concepts of the understanding. Kant leads us to believe that
these categories apply only to experienced objects; objects
of possible human experience which have been pre-spatio-
temporalized by sensibility. As such, the categories do not
apply to things in themselves; things outside possible human
experience. Thus, there is no justification of applying the
categories to things outside of the manifold of sensibility.
However, Kant, at the same time, holds that things-in-thernselves
are the causes of sensation. If such a statement is true then
the category of cause may be applied to things-in-themselves
.
/e are thus left with the contradictory conclusion that
things-in-themselves are experienced, since categories may
only apply to objects of experience. This seemingly
inconsistent consequence of the Kantian hypothesis has its
roots in certain statements made by the nineteenth century
philosopher, Arthur Schopenhauer. He maintained that we cannot
properly speak of things-in-themselves or a thing- in-itself,
since in so doing we seem to apply the category of plurality
or of unity to that which, according to Kant, cannot come
under any category. Agreeing with Schopenhauer, Bertrand
Russell says the following:
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-this inconsistency is not an accidental oversight*it is an essential part of [Kant's] system. 20 ° *
However, there is some doubt as to the cogency of
Schopenhauer's argument. The concept of a thing-in-itself
is consistent if it is understood as a mere negation of what
is known as an object of perception. In this sense, the
concept of noumenon carries with it no metaphysical commit-
ments. Accordingly, it is not necessary that we should know
instances of a negation of a concept in order to speak in
terms ol it. In this connection, Korner believes:
It is
. .
.
possible to reconstruct the critique in
such a way that the concept of a noumena is in fact
used only as a negative concept. 21
Nevertheless, he adds:
But it would be a mistake to regard such reconstruction
as a mere interpretation of Kant's philosophy .22
Thus, the case for Schopenhauer's criticism does not seem
as certain as Hussell would have us believe. However, as
Korner points out, we cannot concede that Kant's critique,
as it is presented, is free and clear of this kind of
inconsistency
. If we agree with Kant that a noumena is simply
an "un-thing" but at the same time affects our senses, the
concept of a noumena is no longer merely negative. A
reconstruction of the concept of a noumena, although possible,
would not be strictly Kantian. Whatever the degree of
20
Ibld
.
.
p. 208.
2
^S. Korner, Kant (Middlesex, G. B. : Penguin Books Ltd.,
I960), p. 94.
2 ^ Ibid
.
.
p. 50 .
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importance one may attach to Schopenhauer’s criticism, we
cannot deny that there is some question as to Kant's theory
of noumena as it is presented.
Before turning to further criticisms engendered by the
Kantian theory of the understanding, it might behoove us to
consider two assumptions Korner finds basic to Kant's concept
of the categories.
Firstly, it is observed that Kant assumed it is possible
to list logical forms of thought. No doubt he was led to
this belief by his complete acceptance of Aristotelian logic.
As such, he believed Aristotelian logic to be a science which
is "closed and completed
.
,i2 3
The second assumption is his inherent belief that no new
a priori concepts can be formed which would unify and
synthesize presentations in a new way. This belief can be
seen to rest upon Kant's dependence on Newtonian physics.
Newton is regarded as having developed the sole method of
scientific enquiry. As such, Kant can envision no other
scientific categories of thought.
In the light of modern science and modern logic these
assumptions have been the target for a great amount of
criticism. Modern logic has shown that there are many more
and different forms of judgement than Kant assumed.
Contemporary logicians have totally abandoned the Aristotelian
syllogism end replaced it with a much more sophisticated
23CPH. p. 17.
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system recognizing many forms of inference. Regarding
physics, one now finds many new scientific categories and
concepts. For example, Korner mentions Whitehead's concept
of four dimensional space and four dimensional events. He
states
:
Here is a concept which is to unify presentations inthe manner exemplified in those objective empiricaljudgements which are found in relativity physics. 24
One could cite many similar examples of new and different
scientific categories of thought for which Kant cannot account.
In what sense, then, can Kant have given us a complete
list of all possible categories of judgement? Perhaps, it
might be thought, his list of categories was sufficient to
explain all judgements of his day. However, even if this was
possible, Kant does not seem to be aware of the shortcomings
of his own interpretation of Aristotelian logic. Of this
Korner says the following:
[Kant believed] ... to list all the possible logical
forms of objective empirical judgement is a possible
task, which is highly doubtful. Indeed, his own list
is mistaken. He considers, for example, that there
is only one form of hypothetical "if-then" judgement;
we now know, as indeed the Stoics knew, that hypo-
thetical judgements have a grammatical similarity
which disguises fundamental logical differences
amongst them. 25
Thus, there is some doubt as to not only the validity of
Aristotelian logic, but also Kant's interpretation of it.
ok
.
'Korner, op. cit .
.
p. 50.
25 Ibid
. ,
p
.
50
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In addition, Kant may be seen to have disclosed a very
biased list of judgements. His ideal of discovering all
categories of thought by which the manifold of sensation is
transformed into a synthetic unity is too greatly slanted
toward only one mode of mental endeavor; namely, the realm
of science. Of this, Ernst Cassirer makes the following
comment:
[Kant believed his analysis]
. . . can disclose the
conditions on which all knowledge of being and the
pure concept of being depend. But the object which
transcendental analytic thus places before us is
the correlate of the synthetic unity of the under-
standing, an object determined by purely logical
attributes. Hence, it does not characterize all
objectivity as such, but only that form of objective
necessity which can be apprehended and described by
the basic concepts of science.
. . . When in the
course of the three critiques Kant proceeds to
develop the true "system of pure reason," he himself
found this objectivity too narrow. In his idealistic
view, mathematics and physics do not exhaust all
reality, because they are far from encompassing all
the workings of the human spirit in its creative
spontaneity .26
Thus, Cassirer feels that Kant has failed to account for a
great number of synthesizing acts by which sensory data may
be objectified. By confining himself to an examination of
the principles exhibited by Newtonian physics, Kant was led
to underestimate, if not miss totally, other significant
structures present and effective within common experience.
Instead of restricting his attention to the superstructure of
science, Cassirer believes that Kant should have tried to
reveal categories of the various other domains of human
2
^Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms . Vol. I,
trans. by Ralph Manheim (New Haven : Yale University Press,
1953), p. 75.
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expression and representation in which perceptions appear as
so many realms of object ivation
.
It appears that we are forced to agree with Cassirer.
In no sense can we say that Kant has supplied us with forms
of thought comprising all human conceptual activity. Indeed,
the categories pertinent to art, literature and language, to
name a few, are not mentioned by Kant. However, we must also
admit that even at the scientific and mathematical level,
where Kant concentrated the bulk of his attention, his list
of categories is still by no means complete.
It has been suggested, by Paton27 for example, that
perhaps Kant's ideal is itself impossible, that one cannot
dislodge from all forms of human endeavor, all forms of thought
pertinent to those endeavors. We shall not be concerned here
with deciding whether or not Paton is correct in this view.
But we shall be concerned with the following question: if it
is possible to discover these forms of thought where should
one look? Furthermore, if these categories of thought are
discoverable in principle, why should we think according to
these rules and not any others?
We have here stumbled upon a problem which Kant does not
seem to sense the importance of; namely, why are we all in
possession of certain categories and no others? Of this,
Kant says the following:
This peculiarity of the understanding, that can
produce a priori unity of apperception solely by
27Paton, op. clt .. p. 211.
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Thus, Kant believes that the problem is suoh that no further
explanation of the categories is needed, or for that matter,
possible. However, Paton disagrees:
Kant’s procedure seems to me consistent, but it doesnot really mee t with the difficulties I have raisedWhy our admittedly a priori knowledge of the
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We have already seen that the Kantian categories are in many
ways incomplete. Moreover, there is still the problem of
deciding where to look for these categories. There clearly
must be some explanation, some reason why we think according
to certain forms of thought and not others. If we can find
such an explanation perhaps we may be able to enlarge and
refine the list of Kantian categories.
Modern anthropology has shown that to a large extent
diverse cultures produce diverse patterns of thought. For this
reason, many neo-Kan tians and modern philosophers in general
have sought to relate categories of thought with culture.
Because cultures express themselves through the medium of
language, language is found to contain the key to the conceptual
system of a particular culture. Culture and language, then are
seen to supply these sought after categories. The neo-Kantian
28CPK. p. 161.
2 9Paton, op. cit
.. p. 565 .
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connection between culture, language, and the categories will
be investigated in what follows.
53
C. Modern Meo-Kantians
: Language and Culture
1. Introduction
.
The criticisms of the Kantian system that I have here
briefly developed must be understood as a fragmentary account
of a vast area of philosophical criticism. Moreover, the
foregoing criticisms have been pre-selected because of their
relevance to the reformulation of the Kantian doctrine by
those scholars called modern neo-Kantians
.
dhe terra "neo-Kan tian " is somewhat vague, for it is
freely applied to a whole gamut of philosophers. For example,
the terra is applied to those who interpret Kant through the
philosophy of Hegel. At the same time, it is also applied to
a class of nineteenth century philosophers who limited
philosophy to the analysis of states of consciousness. However,
in lieu of effective criticism of the Kantian system, it was
natural that philosophers should again take up the problem of
knowledge, to which Kant had given such careful and sober
attention, and subject the various intellectual tendencies of
the age to critical examination. In 1865> 0. Liebmann^^ raised
the cry: "Back to Kant." The critical philosophy, then,
became the rallying point for all those who opposed the methods
of the Hegelians and the progress of materialism, as well as
for those who distrusted metaphysics altogether.
During the early part of the ti^entieth century, this
Frank Thillv, A History of Philosophy (New York: Henry
Holt and Co., 1927), p. ^93.
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movement, called the neo-Kantian movement
,
31 grew to large
proportions. The members of this group emphasized the need
of epistemological investigations, some even regarding the
philological study of Kant’s writings, especially the Critique
o f
,
Jure Reason
.
3^ However, the specific doctrines of those
in this movement varied greatly.
In recent years, however, there has emerged another class
of neo-Kantians
. These philosophers differed from the others
in recognizing language as the key factor in rendering
Kantian philosophy consistent in the light of modern criticism.
Briefly
,
their contention is that language may be seen as the
means by which the sensory manifold is objectified for thought.
As such, language presents a partially completed list of the
Kantian categories and is seen to underly and explain the
Kantian pure intuitions of space and time.
The spokesman of this movement is generally considered
to be Ernst Cassirer. As previously discussed, Cassirer
generally accepts the Kantian methodology but believes that
Kant failed to account for a great variety of synthesizing
acts by which sensory data is objectified— spelled out in order
to be read as experience. In other words, Cassirer denies that
Kant has presented us with a completed list of the categories
32
See, for example, H. Vaihinger, The Philosophy of
"As-If . ” trans. by C. K. Ogden (London: Kegan Paul, Trench,
Tubner and Co., Ltd., and New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.,
1924 ).
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and haS ade
^uate1^ the process of perception.^ He
believes that Kant did not realize the full range of
application for which his method could bear fruit. As such,
he demands an extension of Kant's critical method to domains
of reality other than those structured by Newtonian physics.
Cassirer
* s general doctrine states that the function of
language is not to copy reality but to symbolize it. A
language is a system of categorical devices which give form
to the world. As such, any attempt to distinguish between
language and the world is mistaken.^4 To ask what reality is
apart from these forms inherent in language is irrelevant.
Every form of existence has its source in some peculiar way
of seeing, some intellectual formulation and some intuition
of meaning. Cassirer holds, moreover, that there are several
" languages "35 or "perspectives" each with its own "reality."
Inese are, roughly, the world of common sense, the world of
myth and art, and the world of science.
But how does one go about establishing Cassirer's claim
that language both shapes the world and symbolizes it? If
we cannot "see" the world except through language, there is
no sense in offering empirical evidence for such a view. In
other words, the world we investigate is one already shaped
See the introduction to Ernst Cassirer's, The Philosophy
of Symbolic Forms , trans. by Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1953).
3^Ibid.
, p. 93f.
33Ibld
.
,
p. 107.
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by language. There is no getting outside the limits of
language to verify the fact empirically. This point Cassirer
himself fully realized. It is a necessary consequence of his
philosophical system that this should be so.
Cassirer's philosophy answered many of the questions
rdised jy critics of the Kantian system. Since the form of
his philosophy prevented empirical proof for his claims, many
critics, intoxicated with the positivism of the twentieth
century, found little value in Cassirer's beliefs. However,
two linguists, Whorf and Sapir, independently arrived at much
the same beliefs as Cassirer held. Their thesis was formulated
in such a manner as to be amenable to empirical proof. In
fact, their conclusions were arrived at through data
accumulated in linguistics and anthropology. It is this
formulation of the relation between language and thought that
we shall, shortly, study,
2. The Whorf-Sapir Hypothesis .
With few exceptions, philosophers throughout the history
of philosophy uncritically accepted what may be called the
"copy" theory of language. These philosophers firmly believed
that the relation of a word to the object it denotes, and the
relation of language in general to the world in general, was
one of representation or copying. As such, the function of
language was merely to faithfully reproduce the nature of the
world as it appeared to the observer— in a sense, mirroring
the world. Languages, then, differed only in the names given
to objects. Linguistic communication was conceived as an
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activity in which one is free and untraimeled
,
every language
being equally well fitted for the communication of any and
all beliefs. Thus, traditional philosophy believed that
thinking is an obvious, straightforward activity, the same
for all rational beings, of which language is the straight-
forward medium of expression.
However, modern anthropology and linguistics have shown
that there is no reason to assume that language serves only
as a neutral medium which simply represents experience. In
fact, it is believed that language presents the mold in which
the content of experience is to be poured. Language, then,
is no longer a mere representation of the experienced world,
but is seen to be const! tuitive of experience in the Kantian
sense of the term. More than twenty years ago, Edward Sapir,
a noted linguist and anthropologist, took the first steps in
explicitly formulating this new view of the role of language.
He maintained:
The relation between language and experience is often
misunderstood
. Language is not merely a more or less
systematic inventory of the various items of experience
which seem relevant to the individual, as is so often
naively assumed, but is also a self-contained creative
symbolic organization
,
which not only refers to
experience largely acquired without its help but
actually defines experience for us by reason of its
formal completeness and because of our conscious pro-
jection of its implicit expectations into the field of
experience. 3 f)
Perhaps a more explicit formulation of this doctrine proceeds
36
Edward Sapir, "Conceptual Categories of Primitive
Languages," Science
.
No. (1931)> p. 578*
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as follows:
Human beings do not live in the objective world
?
or alone in the world of social activitv
nf .P
ar^ Jr
^
ti®rstoo^» but are very much at the mercyo the particular language which has become the mediumof expression for their society. It is quite anliusion to imagine that one adjusts to society without
^
“ se ° f la^guage and that language is merely aninciaental means of solving specific problems of
?!
01
!
an
?
refle°tion. The fact of the matter
WOrld " iS t0 9 large ext6nt Uncon-sciously bu.lt up on the language habits of the group. 37
->apir believed that a comparison of radically different
languages would bring a realization of the full force of his
contention. Unfortunately, Sapir died before he had a chance
to complete his work. It remained for another linguist,
Benjamin Lee Vhorf
,
to further develop Sapir's claim. In a
series of scientific papers, which have since been collected
into book form by John B. Carroll, 33 Whorf developed the now
famous "Whorf-Sapir hypothesis." The full and complete
exposition of all fhorf's beliefs is nowhere expressed in one
concise hypothesis, the term "hypothesis" being somewhat of
a misnomer. In fact, many of Whorf 1 s contentions are not
explicitly formulated but may only be seen as lying behind
the veil of some very eloquent rhetoric.
37Edward Sapir, The Selected Writing of Edward Sapir
.
edited by D. G. Wand elbaura (University of California Press,
1949), p. 162.
SR
-^ Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language. Thought, and Reality ,
edited by John B. Carroll (Boston: The Technology Press of M.
I. T. and New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1959).
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Conveniently, Max Black39 has extracted ten propositions,
or theses, from Whorf’ s sometimes exaggerated style of
exposition. These propositions, I believe, separate the wheat
from one chaff and present the main views of Whorf in their
clearest form. These are as follows:
(1) Languages embody "integrated fashions of speaking"
or background linguistic systems,” consisting of prescribed
modes of expressing thought and experience.
(2) A native speaker has a distinctive "conceptual
system" for "organizing experience," and (3) a distinctive
world view” concerning the universe and his relation to it.
(4) The background linguistic system partially determines
the associated conceptual system, and (5) partially determines
the associated world view.
(6) Reality consists of a "kaleidoscopic flux of
impressions .
”
(7) The "facts" said to be perceived are a function of
the language in which they are expressed, and (8) the "nature
of the universe" is a function of the language in which it is
stated
.
(9) Grammar does not reflect reality, but varies
arbitrarily with language.
(10) Logic does not reflect reality, but varies arbitrarily
with language.
It would seem, then, that language works in much the
same way as the Kantian pure intuitions and pure concepts of
the understanding. Whorf believes, as William James did,
that the substratum of experience consists of a blooming,
buzzing world of kaleidoscopic impressions. However, it is
language which gives form to this manifold, which presents
39
Max Black, Models and Metaphors (Ithaca, N. Y.:
Cornell University Press, 19&2), p. 244.
6o
the framework into which reality is to be fitted. Whorf
states
:
segmentation of nature is an aspect of grammar Wecut up ana organize the spread and flow of eventslargely because, We are parties in an agree-ment to do so, not because nature itself is segmentedin exactay that way for all to see. Languages differn not on^y in how they build their sentences but alsoin how they break down nature to secure the elementsto out in those sentences. *K)
And again:
The why of understanding may remain for a long time
mysterious, out the how of logic of understanding—
its background of laws of regularity— is discoverable,
it is the gramma tioal background of our mother tongue
which includes not only our way of constructing
propositions, but the way we dissect nature into
objects and entities to construct propositions about.
The power of Whorf' s claim is readily apparent. His
style i s as stimulating as his ideas themselves. No doubt,
even an extremely dull reader would be stimulated by his
lively presentation. Whorf s exposition is literally charged
with a novelty and originality rarely found in philosophy.
However, although Whorf endeavors to supply proof for all
his contentions, there is much in what he says that remains
unsupported and indeed, some that is tainted with the
mystical. To clarify and investigate Whorf' s claim, it would,
perhaps, behoove us further to break down his hypothesis into
two doctrines, namely, linguistic relativity and linguistic
determinism.
Whorf
,
op . c i
t
.
.
p. 24o.
4l Ibid
.
.
p. 239 .
6l
Linguistic relativity is Whorf's belief that each
language embodies a particular world view or "Weltanschauung.
As such, the speakers of a language are partners to an
agreement to perceive and think of the world in a certain
way not the only possible way. Experience can be structured
m a certain way, or to use Kantian language, the manifold
of sensation can be unified in various ways, by different
languages which operate within these structures.
Linguistic determinism expresses Whorf's belief that the
language of a speaker is the principle determinant of his
thought. Language not only embodies a world view but also
perpetuates this view. A particular language, then,
determines the thought of its speakers.
It is doubtful that Whorf was a serious student of Kant.
In all his essays there is not one reference to Kant or to
his critique. ihere is, however, a great amount of
parallelism between their hypotheses. As Whorf was not a
formal philosopher, the term neo-Kantian being somewhat ill
fitting, it remains for us to deduce the effect of Whorf's
proposals upon our interpretation of neo-Kantian philosophy
if his doctrines are taken seriously.
In the realm of sensation, Kant believed that we have a
pure intuition of space and time. The reasons for this
belief were previously noted. It has, however, come to our
attention that such a doctrine is no longer tenable in the
light of modern physics and mathematics. In addition, ’ rhorf
and others have found cultures of people that do not have the
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same conceptions of time and space to which Kant accords
universality in all human intuition. Of this, Whorf says
the following:
I find it gratuitous to assume that a Hopi [NorthAmerican Indian] who knows only the Hopi language andthe cultural ideas of his own society has thfslmenotions, often supposed to be intuitions of time and
be
a
Sniversal%
haVe ^ that are generally assumed' to
1 fhorf believes there are many ways to intuit space and time.
In fact, there are as many different intuitions of space and
time as there are different languages and cultures. He
states
:
I find iL gratuitous to assume that Hopi thinking
contains any such notion as the supposed intuitively
felt flowing of [Newtonian] "time," or that the
intuition of a Hopi gives him this as one of its data.
Just as it is possible to have any number of geo-
metries other than the Euclidean which give an
equally perfect account of space configurations, so
it is possible to have descriptions of the universe,
all equally valid, that do not contain our familiar
contrasts of time and space.
. . . Thus, the Hopi
language and culture conceals a "metaphysics," such
as our so-called naive view of space and time does. ^3
Thus, the language of a culture embodies a metaphysics which,
in turn, is responsible for a particular intuition of space
and time. There is, then, a relativity of space-time
intuitions behind which lurks the metaphysics inherent in
languages
.
Language, for Whorf, works much in the same way as pure
intuitions do in the Kantian transcendental system. Reality
42
Ibid .
.
p. 57.
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.
.
p. 58.
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is seen as a "kaleidoscopic flux of impressions"^ similar
to the unformed manifold of sensation. Such a flux of
impressions represents the bare substratum of experience. To
-ant, our pure intuitions of space and time unify this flux
or manifold spatiotemporally to make it amenable to experience
'-s such, the intuitions of space and time constitute the form
into which the given material manifold must fit in order for
it to be experienced by human beings. Analogously, Whorf
believes that this manifold or flux must be given form to be
experienced coherently. However, relating to Kantian
sensibility, Whorf has found that different cultures have
diverse "intuition^ of space and time. This relativity of
spatiotemporal intuitions points to a more basic formal
element in experience than Kant had envisioned, which may
boast a universality in all cultures. This element, Whorf
believes, consists of language. The covert features of a
language are seen to produce an intuitive metaphysics
responsible for the formal patterned aspects of experience.
As such, languages operate upon r-aslitj
,
patterning and
structuring the barest elements of sensation into an
intelligible system. He states:
' T
e cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and
describe significances as we do, largely because we
are parties to an agreement to organize it in this
way—an agreement which holds throughout our speech
community and is codified in the patterns of our
language. The agreement is, of course, an implicit
and unstated one, BUT ITS TERMS ARE ABSOLUTELY
44
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™wA?h?Y ’ ?e cannot talk at all except bysubocrtbing to the organization and classificationOf data which the agreement decrees. 45
*' e live
»
then, in a world of appearances, a world in which
reality is not only throttled spatiotemporally as Kant
assumed
,
but arranged in many ways according to the twistings
and turnings of language.
In the light of the Whorfian hypothesis, the Kantian
system can be seen to be amended in such a way that much of
the previously discussed criticisms of Kant are rendered
impotent. If the internal workings of language contain an
implicit metaphysics by means of which its speakers posit a
reality, then it is not surprising that Paton found question
with Kant's theory of spatial and temporal intuitions. Paton
felt that neither space by itself nor time by itself is a
sufficient condition lor all sensual knowledge, that only
their concatenation--space-time--can serve this function.
3uch a belief seems to anticipate Whorf's inferred contention
that intuitions of space and time together are derivable from
the metaphysics implicit in language.
Russell, it is recalled, contended that Kant’s system
does not state why the mind orders the manifold of sensation
as it does and not otherwise. Whorf's hypothesis, however,
readily explains this criticism. Different languages comprise
different systems of metaphysics. Western languages, because
of their great similarity, "cut up reality" in one particular
45
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way, but not the only way. For example, it is Vhorf's
contention that our long standing substance-attribute ontology
is a reflection of the subject-predicate pattern inherent in
the syntax of Indo-European languages. Our language embodies
a "mechanistic'' 40 metaphysics. As such:
. . . the mechanistic way of thinking is perhaps
:;”® fc ® ^
Pe 0f
.
synt
?
x nat
,
ural to Mr. Everyman's daily
Q
S
?
of the western Indo-European languages, rigid ifiedand intensified by Aristotle and the latter's ledievaland modern followers. *7 m
On the other hand, the Hopi cuts up the world in a different
way according ,o ^ kind of syntax resembling chemical
combination.
Similarly
,
it is Whorl's belief that objects are arranged
by us in a Euclidian fashion because Euclidean geometry is
implicit in Western languages and is, therefore, an integral
part of our cultural Weltanschauung. Of this, Whorf says
the following:
Just as it is possible to have any number of geometries
other than the Euclidean which give an equally perfect
account of space configurations, so it is possible to
have descriptions of the universe, all equally valid,
that do not contain our familiar contrasts of time and
space. The relativity viewpoint of modern physics is
one such view, conceived in mathematical terms, and
the Hopi Weltanschauung is another and quite different
one, non-mathematical and 'linguistic.
Thus, the Hopi language and culture conceals a
METAPHYSICS, such as our so-called naive view of space
and time does, or as the relativity theory does; yet
46
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it is a different metaphysics from either.
^
xt is no wonder, then, that Euclidian geometry is as pervasive
ns it is in thought and perception. In addition, Whorl"
b
theory gives all knowledge, sensory as well as "formal " a
single origin in language. Thus, our knowledge of space and
time comes from the sane place as our knowledge of smell and
taste, a la Russell.
In the realm of the understanding, language can again
be seen as underlying the Kantian forms, this time the
forms (categories) underlying thought as such. We have
followed Kant's search for finding pure concepts of the
understanding, concepts which act as the rules and criteria
of all judgement. Kant believed he found such universal forms
of thought in their entirety as given in Aristotelian logic,
ihese forms of thought he called categories, by means of
which objects of experience are related, contrasted, and, in
general, thought. However, we have seen that the Kantian
categories are by no means complete, nor have they the
universality which Kant attributes to them.
Vhorf seems generally to agree with Kant’s method. He,
too, senses the necessity of finding the set of rules by
which thought proceeds. However, unlike Kant, ^horf realizes
that there is something more basic than logic, something
which
,
in fact, presents the logic of thought in entirely
different forms in different cultures. This underlying factor
^ Ibid
.
. p. 238.
67
Is language. The overt and covert forces within language,
the way language fits together, is the way the speakers of
that language must fit together the objects of sensation so
that these objects may be thought. He maintains:
actually, thinking is most mysterious unrl hv +.ugreatest light upon it that we havens 'thro™ bfthe®study of language. This study shows that the form of
of
P
pattern of°whi^h
oontroll
«? by inexorable lawscetto c he is unconscious. These natters
i .
Unperce
i
ved intricat ® systematizations of hisn language shown readily enough by a candid
comparison and contrast with other languages esneoiaiiv
s:iM,
aif"r8nt U^i S tic famifyf I!s'thi^ng
lly
CMniL 1 fa language in English, in Sanscrit, in
^febe *. every language is a vast pattern system
thffei3t frf °^hers » in whiGh ar>e culturally ordainedhe forms and categories by which the personality notonly communicates, but also analyzes nature, notices orneglects types of relationships and phenomena, channelshib reasoning, and builds the house of his conscious-
ness.
Thus, the internal workings of language not only present
a framework in which the manifold or flux of sensation is
unified and presented as coherent experience, but may also
be seen as presenting the completed list of categories which
serve as a set of rules and criteria by which the mind may
relate and compare pre-arranged objects of experience. The
Kantian thing-in-itself may be viewed as what lies outside the
linguistic framework of sensation and thought. In this way,
Whorf’s metaphysics is greatly similar to Kant's. Both agree
that we live in a world of appearances, a world which is pre-
formed by certain structuring agents. However, Kant believed
that there was but one world of appearances, the universality
50 Ibid
.
.
p. 252.
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of these appearances being necessitated by the functioning
of the human mind. For Whorf, however, there are as many’
different realities as there are languages; for each language
embodies a cultural metaphysics. He states:
The real question is: What do different larrma^Q
clo
> W
T
th th© artificially isolated objects "[ofsensation] but with the flowing face of nature in1 ,s motion, color, and changing form, with cloudsbeaches and yonder flights of birds? For, as roes’our segmentation of the face of nature, so r0fs ourphysics of the cosmos. 51
Hence, language cuts up nature and gives form to the unformed
according to its internal workings. But in what sense can
the ordering nature of language be a priori in the Kantian
sense of the word? Whorf seems to indicate that the prior
existence of some language pattern is both necessary and
sufficient to produce some thought pattern. In this sense
language is logically prior to thought, although language
itself is learned through experience.
At this point, it must be stated emphatically that the
parallelisms I have here outlined between the Whorf-Sapir
hypothesis and the F.antian transcendental system are
completely inferred. As previously mentioned, Whorf never
formally tied his beliefs to Kant's. For this reason much
that I have noted lacks a certain degree of specificity. As
'horf’s accounts may suffer from too great a generality, so
mine must also.
^ 1 Ibid
.
.
p. 244.
69
What
'
then
’
are the Principal improvements of the
Whorfian hypothesis with respect to the Kantian system?
Firstly, Whorf recognizes not only a relativity of categorical
schemes, but presents the basis of a more inclusive set of
categories than Kant envisioned. Secondly, Whorf has accounted
for not only the genesis of the Kantian categories, but also
has explained the Kantian pure intuitions of space and time
and made them beliefs understandable in the light of modern
science and mathematics. Thirdly, Whorf presents empirical
evidence for his beliefs. This evidence, anthropological
and linguistic in nature, is designed to show how the workings
of language effect a structuring of the universe by its
speakers. As Whorf believes that his thesis is scientifically
verifiable, we shall shortly embark upon a more empirical
investigation of his claims. For the moment, however, it
may be seen that the inferred Whorfian reformulation of the
Kantian system stands or falls with Whorf* s doctrine of
linguistic relativity, and more definitely, with his doctrine
of linguistic determinism. However, further specifics must
await a critical evaluation of Whorf* s claims.
1,_ The Case for Linguistic Relativity and Determinism .
We have seen that the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis has many
points in common with the neo-Kantian philosophjr of Ernst
Cassirer and others. However, Whorf's hypothesis, unlike
similar neo-Kantian doctrines, claims to be amenable to
empirical investigation
. In fact, Whorf believes he has
70
provided such evidence from the fields of linguistics and
anthropology to buttress his contentions.
5
2 To render
explicit the senses in which language presents the Kantian
categories and intuitions of sensation, it behooves us to
examine this evidence.
The evidence Whorf presents for his doctrines of linguistic
relativity and determinism comes largely from anthropological
linguistics
.
T
-
T
owever, evaluation of this sort of evidence is
the task of the linguist. What I shall here be concerned
with is the philosophical import of Whorf’ s procedure.
Io sup ort his beliefs, Whorf claims to have discovered
a way ox breaking down language into .subsys terns composed of
patterns. ' Patterns are formed of words that exhibit a
mutual "rapport, “ enabling them to "work together to any
semantic result. As such:
H ls t\ls raPPort that constitutes the real essence ofthought insofar as it is linguistic
. 55
Words are held in rapport by the workings of invisible "linkage
bonds." The centering of words around these linkage bonds
become recognisable as what Whorf calls a "covert class.”
52An excellent discussion of Whorf’ s linguistic analysis
of American Indian languages and how they support his con-
tentions is presented by Roger Brora, Words and Things (Glencoe,
I1L: The Free Press, 1959), p. 229f
. ,
and Paul Henle. Langcuaee.
i hough t. and Culture (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1958)
,
p. If.
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Covert classes differ from commop overt classes In that the
former are readily seen as part of the grammar of the language
in question, the latter being more difficult to observe.
Whorf gives the following example which may clarify the
differences between covert and overt classes:
AJ i^ lstic clas sification like English render
??
8 ”° °y ert actualized along Slth the
invi'qihin
t
«
e
°las ? but which operates through anSlble central exchange" of linkage bonds in
?u
way
,
as t0 determine certain other words which
an'ov^l
1 C
?
U C0VERT in contrast toOVJli class, such as gender in Latin. 56
It is Whorf's contention that the aforementioned patterns—
discoverable by investigating the covert categories or forms
of language—have "meaning," giving vent to a particular
conceptual scheme. These "meaningful" grammatical arrangements
Hiorf calls "cryptotypes ."
5
^ To use his example, Whorf
observes three classes of Hopi verbs. 58 Upon further analysis,
he isolates a set of covert categories or cryptotypes which
may be seen to underlie their use. He states:
Prom phenomena of this sort, which are not confined
to the inceptive problem but pervade all Hopi grammar
I conclude that there must be to the Hopi speaker adimly felt relation of similarity between the verb
usages in eacn group having to do with some inobvious
facet of their meaning, and therefore itself a mean-
ing, but one so nearly at or below the threshold of
conscious thinking, that it cannot be put into words
by the user and eludes translation. To isolate,
characterize and understand the operation of these
dimly felt, barely conscious (or even unconscious)
meanings is the object of ny further analysis. Such
an illusive, hidden, but functionally important
5^ Ibid
.
,
p. 69 .
57Ibid
.. p. 88.
58 Ibid
.
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meaning I call a "CBYPTOTYPE. "-59
These cryptotypes, then, convey a hidden meaning displaying
part of the overall pattern of the Hopi picture of the
universe. However, there ere many who disagree with Whorf'
s
imputation of meaning to these covert linguistic categories.
Black, for example, maintains:
i
di
{£iculty lies in the claim that theryptotypes have meaning ' for the unsophisticated
J
v
f
speaker, ••••horf speaks of "a sort of habitualconsciousness"; of "a submerged, subtle, and elusive
meaning, of a ’formless idea," a "rising towardful.er consciousness ... of linkage bonds," and soon. nit it Is hard to believe that the ordinary
speaker is aware of a grammatical classification thattakes all the virtuosity of a Whorf to discover. Idoubt ,hat the average English speaker realizes thatthe particle "un-" can be prefixed only to transitive
verbs of a "covering, enclosing, and surface attaching
meaning that constitutes a prototype. Whorf himself
5
must have the concept since he succeeds in expressing
it, but the man in the English street simply uses
UT1
**„ in haPPy ignorance. Here I think Whorf commits
>d)e linguist 1 s fallacy’ of imputing his own sophisti-
cated attitudes to the speakers he is studying. The
heuristic value of the notion of a crypto type is
manifested in its capacity to induce verifiable pre-
dictions; the rest is mythical psychology.6o
There is, this investigator believes, a great deal in what
Black has to say. Whorf needs to show further proof for the
contention that these cryptotypes have meaning. Even if
linguists universally agreed on the imputation of meaning to
a cryptotype, Whorf' s claim that such a meaning is part and
parcel of an implicit metaphysics would remain unsubstantiated.
59
Ibid
.
6o Black, op. cit .. p. 2^7.
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Let us examine more closely Whorf »s belief that we "cut
up nature, organize it into concepts" 61 by way of language.
He supplies us with two kinds of proof for this contention.
First, we are presented with data concerning the Nootka
language of a certain Vancouver Island Indian culture. Whorf
points out the fact that in this language a single word will
often express what in English will require a complete
sentence to be intelligible. For example, the English
sentence, "He invites people to a feast.", in Nootka, would
be the single word, "tl ' irashya
' isita »itlma,
"
62 literally
translated as "Boiled eaters go for he does." Another
exanole is taken from the Apache language. It is seen that
the English sentence, "It is dripping spring, 0 when literally
translated from an equivalent Apache expression, becomes
hiteness moves downward. From these and other examples,
Fhorf draws the conclusion: "How utterly unlike our way of
thinking. 0 According to Whorf:
These examples show that some languages have means
of expression—chemical combination, 'as I called
it—in which the separate terms are not so separate
as in English but flow together into plastic
synthetic creations. Hence, such languages, which
do not paint the separate-object picture of the
universe to the same degree as English and its
sister tongues, point toward new types of logic and
6lWhorf, op. cit
.. p. 213.
62 Xbid .
.
p. 243.
u3
Ibld
.
.
p. 241.
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possible new oosmical pictures. 6 ^
ThUS
’
llter ’ 1 translati°u is supposed to indicate how diverse
languages "out up" or "segment" the universe in different
fashions. In this way language embodies a metaphysics
partially explicable by such translations.
second class of proof concerns the referent categories
and names a particular language may apply to phenomena.
Vhorf seems most interested in cases in which one language
has a single category or name for something while another
language has more than one (i.e., different) categories for
referring to the same thing. For example, Vhorf shows that
in Hopi there is a single word for all flying things except
birds
. Vhere speakers of English say "aviator," "butter-
fly, and "airplane, 1 the Hopi can use only a single word.
Another example of this is noted by Brown. 67 In this case it
is found that the Eskimo lexicon contains three words to
denote different kinds of snow for which English does not
; /e their single-word equivalents. It seems we use "snow"
for all three. From these and other examples of names and
lack of names, categories rich in distinctions and poor in
distinctions all differing from what is found in English,
Vhorf would have us believe that speakers of diverse languages
see and understand entirely different relationships among
65
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phenomena than we do. Such differences, he maintains, again
show how language contains hidden metaphysical schemes.
Let us now examine the grounds upon which Whorf's
"proofs" may be seen to support his thesis; that language
"cuts up" and "segments" reality and imputes a "metaphysics"
to its speakers. Assessing Whorf's use of literal traps-
la t ion, Brown says the following:
Perhaps rhorf's Indian premises ought to be appliedto trench
,
German or Latin, and we should all speak
of psychological differences between peoples who
ad
^Hctives before nouns and those‘ who put them
after. 00
As any literal translation of German will show, ^9 the
structural variance between literally translated German and
English is practically as great as between Hopi and English.
Are we to assume, on the basis of differently structured
grammar, that the German people have a distinctly different
world viei\T than we do? By Whorf's own admission, however,
we all share a common Western Weltanschauung. Thus, it seems
that V/horf allows the products of sympathetic translation to
be admissible as evidence for his contention is some cases,
but not in others. W© must agree with Brown that:
We do not have the basic knowledge in psychology and
language that would enable us to decide intelligently
on the premises that ought to underlie translation.
The evidence of the literal translation does not
establish linguistic relativity. The relativity is
assumed in the premises underlying Whorf's "un-
sympathetic" translations. 70
'5 ':
'Ibid., p. 233 .
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As such, Whorf raay be once again guilty of what Black terras
the "linguist's fallacy," that is, reading attitudes into
the speakers of the languages under study.
what are we to make of the cases Whorf cites where certain
languages contain particular names and referent categories
for phenomena that other languages do not classify or name in
the same way? Does Whorf believe that the Hopi, whose
language contains no distinguishing names or categories for
the English "butterfly," "aviator," or "airplane," does not
cognitively distinguish between these three phenomena? It
may be seen, to use another example, that although English
presents no formal words to distinguish between types of snow
as do Eskimo languages, we have no difficulty recognizing and
conceptualizing different types of snow. In fact, Brown
points out, children readily identify many varieties of
snow; i.e., hard
-packing, soft-packing, sleigh-riding, etc.
Moreover, skiers identify granular, powder, "sugar," and
"good-tracking" snow. Aside from the obvious perceptual
distinctions between butterflies, airplanes, and the like,
there seems to be no reason to assume that the Hopi is unable
to distinguish perceptually or conceptually between these
"flying things" in spite of the fact that his language makes
no provisions for such distinctions. In fact, there seems to
be universal agreement among linguists that equivalent
phenomena can be recognized by speakers of any language. 72
71 Ibid
.
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p. 233 .
72 Ibid .
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Vhorf's error may again be the "linguist's fallacy."
Another pertinent criticism of the Whorfian hypothesis
in either form of presentation concerns the idea of
Weltanschauung. According to Vhorf, a particular language
embodies an implicit metaphysics which, in turn, gives vent
to or determines the world view or Weltanschauung of its
speakers. However, it seems quite peculiar that within the
course of history, the speakers of SAE? 3 (standard Average
European the similarity of Western- languages allows them to
be lumped into one group) have never universally agreed on
any philosophy nor subscribed to any one world view. What,
then, is the metaphysics inherent in SAE? What is the Western
Weltanschauung? The philosophy that Vhorf professes to
discern in SAE is not the unformulated world view of the lay-
man or the man in the street, but is a tintype of Newtonian
scientific theory. This, horf believes, is our particular
Weltanschauung. It is here that Max Black introduces a
salient criticism:
To the contention that this is the metaphysics
embodied in the western languages (only awaiting
formulation by the analyst) the sufficient answer
is that Descartes—another "standard average
European "--was led to a metaphysical system radically
different. Languages that botu Hume and Hegel could
use with equal fluency can hardly embody a unique
philosophy. 74
In what sense, then, can we be said to have one world view?
73Arhorf, op. cit .. p. 138.
^Black, op. cit .. p. 254.
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In addition, if the doctrine of linguistic determinism is
accepted, one would be hard put to account for the presence
of such intellectual giants as Einstein, Whitehead, and
Bergson; for they were able to compose philosophical systems
clearly antagonistic to Whorf's
-Newtonian Western Weltan-
schauung.” Moreover, it is indeed a wonder how Whorf himself
was able to escape the linguistic
"thought-chains" of his
native English and understand the linguistic and thought
processes of the Hopi Indians, the culture from which most
of his inferences are drawn.
It is, of course, an obvious fact that a particular
language and vocabulary is imposed upon the minds of children
by parents of a particular culture. In this sense a kind of
determinism exists; for the linguistic behavior of the parent
exists before that of the child. However, Brown points out:
called "cats*' and dogs "dogs," but, in
addition
,
the former are fed milk while the latterbones « referent categories revealed bythe child in his naming behavior could have beenlearned from the non-linguistic discriminating
behavior of his parents. 75
Thus, it is safe to say that a child inherits a language
(vocabulary and grammar) from his parents, but this is a far
cry from the contention that categories of thought are
inherited in the same way.
This brings us to perhaps the most cogent criticism that
can be levelled against the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis as it stands.
75
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Whorf does not distinguish operationally between the thought
and language in question. Until this is done it is impossible
to fit any kind of empirical evidence to his hypothesis. If
thought is defined in terms of language, which it seems to be
for Whorf
,
then the connection between the two is one of
logical necessity. It is therefore not surprising that Whorf
found his convictions so convincing.
To render Whorf* s hypothesis amenable to empirical
testing it is necessary to operationally define both thought
and language and measure their relationship. There is a
certain sense of the relativity thesis that is established
on this basis. If "language" is defined as a formal system
(phonology, morphology, and grammar), and "thought" as a set
of categories serving as rules for naming, the thesis that
language and thought covary is established if it is shown that
formally distinct languages are also semantically distinct.
•3rown believes that there is ample evidence that this is true
on the level of the lexicon and of certain grammatical
ns
categories. The evidence Brora presents for his belief
leans heavily upon a study made by Zipf in 1935- 77 Compiling
lists of writings in Chinese, Latin, British and American
English, Zipf showed that there exists a statistical tendency
in language for the length of a word to negatively correlate
with its frequency of usage. Examples of this phenomenon are
76 Ibid
.
.
p. 261.
77
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.
p. 235 .
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very common. For instance, common names are shortened to
nickname©. television" has been shortened to "video" and
finally to T In general, then, as a word becomes more
commonly used, it tends to become shortened. What is here
important to note is that Zipf's correlation greatly bears
upon Vhorf's contention. Of this Brown states:
ouppose we generalize the finding beyond Zipf'sformulation and propose that the length of a verbalexpression (codability) provides an index of itsfrequency in speech, and that this, in turn, is anindex ol the frequency with which the relevantjudgements of difference and equivalence are made.
A J*? 18 f £ , true » it would follow that the Eskimodistinguishes his throe kinds of snow more oftenthan Americans do. 78
Ihus, Zipf'g correlation gives substance to a certain sense
of linguistic relativity. According to this view, a given
language does not determine its speakers to think or perceive
according to certain patterns, but favors or encourages the
discrimination of certain patterns over others. An Italian,
for example, whose language makes no provision for the
recognition of many types of snow, can discriminate among as
many varieties of snow as can the Eskimo, whose language
contains such provisions. The, Italian, however, is not prone
to make such discriminations. Swanson sums up this view as
follows
:
For although in Italian or English we could
. by means
of circumlocution, Identify the different kinds of
snow, the absence of a short and readily available
term for these categories [consistent with Zipf's law]
78Ibid
.
.
p. 238.
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discourages us, as it were, from doing so. 7?
Furthermore, Henle states:
i'?L
q
o?
Sti0?1
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i?
en becomes one of whether knowing an
«nn?^
f
+-T
0Ca
^
Ulary ”*"at least on e Which has
tc\ serlse experience—constitutes a setdirected toward perceiving in terms of this wordIhe existence of such a set would mean noticingthose aspects of the environment to the applicationof the term and tending to neglect others.BO
ihis sense of linguistic relativity seems quite reasonable.
However, it is a far cry from what Whorf has claimed.
Brown has devised a method for testing a more exciting
form of the relativity thesis. He would proceed by
defining "language” so as to include semantics anddefining thought' in terms of some nonlinguisticbehavior. In general the thesis here would be that
some nonlinguistic evidence of thought covaries with
some linguistic evidence. For example, it might be
maintained that making statues of justice goes withthe membership of the word with this concept in aform class that has generally the "object or "thing"
semantic. The relativity thesis could then be
checked by looking at the statues and form classes of
social groups and of individuals . 81
As regards determinism:
If an attempt is made to go beyond relativity to
determinism we see at once that there are two possible
kinds of chronological priority the linguistic’ form
might have—either historical or biographical. One
could see whether the linguistic practice preceded the
making of statues in the history of a group and one
could see whether knowledge of the linguistic practice
came before the inclination to make a statue in the
life of the individual. 32
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However
,
it is significant that Brown states:
though?: wh?KrSfd ?S^“i?* 8 of.^We and
°f rel
X
t
aon't f-
that "an ?SepaS«tlJ t0 sh™
ses-s ssH^^ t?MrSt
b le ^irst step toward demonstrating it. §3
J ^
It is seen, then, that only after many studies of the type
Brown proposes, will it be possible to suggest which features
of grammar might in general be expected to correlate with
language. In so doing, the philosophical maxim "correlation
does not imply causality" must be taken heed of.
How, then, stands the case for linguistic relativity and
determinism? Not too good— in its Whorfian form. The
generality of Whorf's hypothesis, coupled with the unprovable
form in which it is presented, prevents empirical testing.
Moreover, the failure of Whorf's doctrines to stand up to
philosophical examination casts grave doubts upon its validity.
However, a mild form of the relativity thesis, which carefully
discriminates between the language and thought in question,
seems to be acceptable to many linguists and philosophers.
It is important to note that this sense of the relativity
thesis is believed secure enough to overthrow the traditional
copy theory of language. However, it is generally agreed
that more data is needed in order to make any stronger
assertions in favor of '/horf’s contentions. Future studies
S3
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might reveal such meaningful relationships between language
and thought, but it is safe to say that they will not
maintain the more extreme kind of relationships that Whorf
envisioned
.
v v
PART THREE
A BRIEF VIEW OF
A DIFFERENT APPROACH: LpTGuj 3 ; PHI [ OOP' 'HY
III. A BRIEF VTKtf OPA
i
DIFFERENT APPROACH: LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY
A. Introduction
We have seen that the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis seems to
bolster the Kantian system and account for many of its
inconsistencies. However, it seems that the form in which
it is presented and, indeed, much of the matter of its
beliefs, prevent it from having much objective merit as a
scientific hypothesis or as a philosophical system. Never-
theless, Whorf's writings are not of little value. We have
seen that their reformulation by Brown and others have raised
a moderate form of the Whorfian claim to the status of a
tenable scientific hypothesis. In addition, Whorf’s writings
have motivated linguists, anthropologists, and psychologists
toward research in the field of psycho-linguistics— that
hybrid discipline which investigates psychologically the
connection between language and thought. As regards philosophy,
however, there is yet another approach to the problem of the
relation of language to thought which remains to be investi-
gated—viz. linguistic philosophy. To this we will now proceed.
At the turn of the century many philosophical disciplines
broke away from the main subject area of philosophy and became
self-sufficient, empirical, scientific domains. These
sciences, as well as the many others already in existence,
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boasted a distinct subject matter within relatively well
defined limits. The newly formed science of psychology,
adopting the scientific method of inquiry, invaded the very
strongholds of traditional philosophical subject matter.
Furthermore, progress in these fields showed that philosophy
could not hope to compete with the methods of empirical
science. What, then, was left for philosophy? What was to
be philosophy's subject matter and its limits in the light of
these new and well defined sciences?
At this time a new sphere of philosophical study emerged.
It came as almost a revelation to philosophers searching for
the proper area in which to direct their activities. This
new philosophical interest centered around the idea of
"meaning" 1— that sense of meaning embodied by language in its
capacity to permit communication. As such, language presents
the basic building blocks of meaning which, in its use, can
be studied in its most highly developed form. In this regard,
philosophers carefully distinguished between an object-
language and a meta-language. An object-language is the common
language of a particular discipline. A meta-language is a
language developed for the purpose of analysing the meanings
and uses of words expressed by the object-language. As such,
philosophy witnessed a shift of emphasis from the strict
study of ethics, theology, etc., to the study of meta-ethics,
^Cf. Erik Stenius, Wittgenstein's "Tractatus " (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, i960), p. If.
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meta-theology, etc. Thus, philosophers proceeded to logically
clarify and Illuminate the ends of language and the ways m
which language is able to achieve these ends. The linguistic
philosopher, then, scrutinizes all statements—those made by
theologians, mathematicians, scientists, philosophers, etc.,
past and present—bringing his new techniques to bear on them
as well. In time, linguistic significance became the primary
subject matter of contemporary philosophy.
Once stated, it soon became apparent to many philosophers
that this new understanding of the proper subject matter of
philosophy was "new" in its explicitness only. The history
of philosophy since the time of Socrates, whose passionate
interest was in the meaning of "Justice,” "Knowledge," and
"Good," could also be interpreted as a quest for meaning.
Thus, the methods and subject matter of traditional philosophy
was not entirely alien to the new formulation of philosophy's
sphere of interest.
As more and nore philosophers joined the bandwagon of
linguistic philosophy, the method and goals of their pursuit
solidified. Instead of attempts at synthesis typical of the
philosophy of the past, linguistic philosophy unfurled the
banner of analysis. The function of philosophy under the new
auspices, then, was to engage in the analysis of the meaning
and structure of language. As such, the relation of thought
to language is much akin to this pursuit. Neo-Kantians
contended that Kant's thesis is greatly supported if language
is seen to present the perceptual patterns of experience and
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the categories of thought. Whorf and Saplr maintained a
doctrine of the relation of language to thought that infers
a similar assertion from data in anthropology and linguistics,
however
,
linguistio philosophers, in their study of meaning
and language, present other approaches to the neo-Kantlan
contention of the connection between language and the
rhilosophy of Kant.
In this paper, I will consider one such approach, that
of P. Strawson. Strawson's philosophy, although
structurally similar in principle to that of Kant and his
followers
,
differs mainly as to the methods employed in
analysis and the evidence Strawson submits for his beliefs.
In this sense Strawson's philosophy offers a different
approach to the problem at hand. Let us proceed to investigate
Strawson's contention with an eye toward its relevance to
Kant's hypothesis.
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B. Location of Particulars
Before exploring that part of Strawson’s philosophical
endeavor pertinent to the matter at hand, it may be well to
outline first some epistemological considerations important
as background to the proper understanding of his philosophy.
The common man has long believed that everyday things,
ordinary sorts of physical objects that are freely recognized
and commonly talked of in his social milieu, are indeed the
most real things imaginable. The eminent Dr. Johnson expressed
this belief succinctly by kicking a now famous stone to show
its reality. We must agree that it is difficult to doubt
the full existence of something publicly observed, felt, and
discoursed about. Now we must ask, do we know these ordinary,
public objects only as subjective sense data, or do we know
and understand subjective sense data by means of objective
public objects? Unlike Dr. Johnson, Berkeley maintained the
former thesis. Impressed with the fact that we know external
objects only mediately through the senses, Berkeley embarked
upon a philosophical venture that would deny their existence.
Uowever
,
in his quest to prune bare sense data from external
objects, Berkeley had continually to refer to public objects
to locate these sense data. In describing a private sense
datum, one must resort to describing what is publicly under-
stood as a color, sound, smell, etc., if one is to communicate.
When one tries to describe a particular private sensation, one
finds that reference to a particular public thing—a color,
object, etc.—best identifies this sense datum. It seems,
39
then, that private sense data are identified and rendered
communicable (objective) by reflecting them in public objects.
As Berkeley succeeded in communicating his impressions, it is
assumed that he as well must have relied upon public external
objects as the locus of objective (communicative) reference
to private sensations. How, then, is it possible to
explicitly doubt the existence of external objects if one is
logically dependent upon them for communication? Thus, it
seems that Berkeley's quest is doomed to failure; for we must
assume the latter hypothesis— that private sense data are
understood (rendered intelligible) only in terras of public
objects— in order to prove the former.
nevertheless, there have been philosophers of this
century who have tried to isolate private sense data from
public objects and to understand science as that pursuit
which merely classifies and systematizes regularities in this
bare stream of raw experience. This doctrine may be called
positivism, or radical empiricism. However, sense data seem
inseparable from the objects by way of which sensations are
presented. We cannot feel unless there is an object blocking
the path of our hand. Similarly, there must be something
present to absorb or reflect light for us to see. It seems,
then, that the only way to make sense out of the statement
"raw experience exhibits regularities," is to understand
"raw experience" as ordinary experience; our everyday
experience which indeed exhibits regularities. However, this
is not the sense that was intended. As defined, raw
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experience must be unstructured
to note, in the words of Quine,
Accordingly, it is important
that
vaw experience simply will not of n-q Pu „ ,
an autonomous domain! References to SpiiiKbiSfis largely what holds it together. 2 r objects
Thus, objects are inseparable from experience. In addition,
external objects, or rather reference to external objects-
sinoe in memory they are no longer present as objects-gives
us continuing access to the realm of past impressions. In
fact, it is believed that external objects and reference to
external objects is what gives continuity to experience past,
present, and future.
Let us now investigate what it means to refer to external
objects. It is significant that Chisholm 3 has found that
memories are traces not of past sensations but of past
conceptualization and verbalization. This seems to be a
fairly plausible hypothesis. In reflecting upon yesterday's
weather, I recall the fact that it was "raining." I remember
that the sky was "grey" and the rain felt "wet." However, I
have not here recaptured the feeling^ (sensations) of the
day's greyness or wetness. I may try to imagine being "wet"
or seeing "grey," but such an attempt can only begin to
approach the vivacity of the original. Today's hot sun and
blue sky further mock this endeavor. In remembering, then,
I have substituted the linguistic entities "wet" and "grey"
^Willard Van Orman Quine, Word and Object (Boston: The
Technology Press and New York: John Wiley and Sons, i960), p. 2
3ft. M. Chisholm, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study (Ithaca
Cornell University Press, 1957), P« 108.
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for yesterday's particular bundle of sense data. We may now
see that much of present experience, past experience, and
much that is anticipated as future experience, is bound up
with verbalization and conceptualization. Reference to
external objects—hereafter called particulars— is thus
intimately related to the medium in which such reference
takes place, i.e., language. One of the functions of
language, then, is to refer to particulars. General reference
and identifying reference to particulars are made through its
office. Such reference to particulars, it is believed,
allows for the continuity of our experiences.
'•hat may be inferred from the previous statements? If
the continuity of our experience is based upon reference to
particulars and if, in conception, language presents the
verbal patterns in which such identifying reference takes
place, it seems that .we may rightly infer that an
investigation of language--the conceptual use of language
—
might reveal a conceptual scheme which would explain how our
reference to particulars, and, therefore, our coherency of
experience, proceeds. This is what P. F. Strawson has
attempted in his book Individuals '?
Strawson terras his endeavor "descriptive metaphysics"-^
and claims that it is in the Kantian tradition of
^P. F. Strawson, Individuals: An assay in Descriptive
Metaphysics (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd
., 1959)
.
3 Ibld
. , p . 9
.
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transcendental philosophy. As such, his ala Is to describe
the actual structure of our thoughts about the world. He is
concerned with isolating and exhibiting certain entities that
must be recognized as playing a fundamental role in all our
thought about things and events. It is not surprising that
these basic entities are found to be particulars. To clarify
and understand the role played by particulars, Strawson
begins his treatment of the subject with an investigation of
what it means to identify.
It is first noticed that there is a speaker's and a
hearer's sense of the term "identify." 6 A speaker may make
an identifying reference to a particular. If the hearer
knows which particular is being referred to, he is able to
identify" that particular. '-rith this sense of "identity"
rendered explicit, Strawson proceeds to explore the anatomy
of identification of particulars with an eye toward locating
the class or classes of particulars that are most basic in
thought
.
It must be immediately recognized, Strawson argues, that
there is a sense of identification which must be eliminated
as a non-important and trivial case. This is called "story
relative identification." It occurs when a particular is
identified in an immediate speaker-given context. It is
trivial because the particular is identified in that context
^
Ibid
.
.
p. 16.
^ Ibid
.
.
p. 13.
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and thnt context °"ly. ana is unrelated to the history and
experience of the hearer. For example, if a speaker were to
relate the story of "the three bears” to the hearer,
identification of "Goldilocks" would proceed from the story
itself, irrespective of the hearer's history or background.
ft criterion must be invoked to render this sense of
identification inappropriate to identification in general.
The forthcoming criterion states that the particular must be
able to be placed in the hearer's own picture of the world
8directly, independent of the speaker.
These considerations lead Strawson to a discussion of
demonstrative and non-demonstrative identification of
particulars. Demonstrative identification denotes objects
directly given to us, comprising what Wittgenstein termed
"ostensive definition."^ Children learn their first words by
way of ostensive definition. This process proceeds when a
parent points to a door, says "door," and asks the child to
do the same. In this way a child learns the names of things.
As such, demonstrative identification poses no real problems
to the identification of particulars in general. It fits
well within the bounds of the formerly stated criterion.
However, demonstrative identification accounts for a small
number of cases of what is understood by identification. We
may have only so many particulars directly confronting us at
8Ibid
.
.
p. 19.
^Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations , trans
lated by G. E. M. Anscombe fNew York: The Macmillan Co., 1961)
p. 7.
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a specific time. Accordingly, unless there are cases of
non
-demonstrative identification of particulars, there would
be \ ery little that could be truly communicated. In most
communication, then, identification of particulars proceeds
by way of non-demonstrative identification. This occurs when
demonstrative identification is impossible because the
particular to be identified is not sensibly present.
It has been argued that we can never be sure that a non-
demonstrative identification succeeds in individuating a
specific particular, for there is always the chance of finding
duplication in the universe. As non-demonstrative
identification can proceed only with the backing of general
descriptions of the particular in question, there is some
question whether any number of descriptions can succeed in
individuating a specific particular. For example, there might
be another particular answering the same descriptions as the
particular the speaker has in mind existing in another part
of the universe. Strawson counters this argument with the
suggestion that non-demonstrative identification may rest on
a basic demonstrative element. ^ He finds it necessary to
admit that we are each in possession of a unified system of
spatial and temporal relations in which every particular is
uniquely related to every other. By demonstrative identifi-
cation we can determine a common point of spatial and temporal
10
„
otrawson, op. ci
t
.
.
p. 22.
n ibid.
,
p. 25 .
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reference
,
and from this it is possible to deduce the location
of other particulars in space and time relative to our
reference point. Thus, Strawson, as well as Kant, found a
peculiar comprehensiveness and pervasiveness associated with
spatiotemporal relations. Accordingly, he states that space
and time serve as the framework in which we may organize
individuating thought about particulars. Thus, the system
described is a transcendental system in sense of describing
our one of many possible schemes of understanding the world.
as with Kant, the knower shapes and forms the objective world
according go his ways of knowing. Strawson's endeavor is
concerned with exhibiting our peculiar scheme of understanding
the world "out there." According to Strawson, our
identification of particulars, of particular things and events
in a spatiotemporal framework, allows for our single, unified
picture of the world.
If it is conceded that we possess such a system, a
conceptual scheme of spatiotemporal relations, it is necessary
that reidentif ics tion of particulars or acknowledgement of
sameness of particulars, is accounted for. This is achieved
with due regard to the skeptic by recognizing the following
12
facts: our observation is limited so that the entire spatio-
temporal framework is not presented to us at any one instant;
there is no part of it that we can continuously observe; and
we do not occupy a fixed position in it. Thus, our system
12 Ibid
.
.
p. 31.
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must lean heavily on what Strawson terms
"qualitative
recurrences These are separate observations of the same
patterns and arrangements of objects. In addition, it can
also be shown that the reidentif lcation of places is not
different from the reidentiflcation of things. There is, in
iriCL, an interplay of the two.
Having described a transcendental, unified, spatiotenporal
system as conditioning our thoughts of identification of
particulars, Strawson endeavors to investigate the possibility
of finding that class or those classes of particulars upon
which this system of particulars is based. It is found that
certain particulars exhibit identiflability-dependence to
other particulars. As an example, the case of "private
particulars" is examined. 1^ Private particulars are particulars
of mental events and private sense data. For example, a
buzzing sound may exhibit identiflability-dependence to the
source of buzzing; a bee, perhaps. More basically, such sense
data may be traceable to the self-consciousness of the hearer,
the identiflability-dependence of the buzz to the agent hearing
the buzz, the sensing person. Thus, these types or categories
of particulars are mainly dependent upon other particulars,
namely persons who have such "feelings
,
11 and therefore display
identifiability-dependence to a set of particulars called
persons. Perhaps this is what Kant had in mind in his belief
13
14
Ibid
.
.
p. 33 .
IbicI
.
. p. 34.
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that "I think" must accompany all representations. One group
of classes displaying identifiability-dependence are the
classes of theoretical constructs and unobservables in
general. These are the postulated entities of Physics,
Political Science, etc. Their identification rests upon the
identification of grosser, observable bodies.
ihere are, however, many other classes of particulars
that may display identif iability-dependence. At the same
time, it becomes evident that any particulars that can be
directly located without the aid of or reference to any other
particular are the basic particulars that we are searching for.
To expedite this search, Strawson recognizes two types or
categories of publicly observable particulars These are
events and processes (states and conditions) and material
bodies. This somewhat Whiteheadian*^ division bears fruitful
results. It is observed that the first category of particulars,
events and processes, suffers from a lack of framework
building adequacy. They seem to show a dependence upon more
enduring entities, namely the material objects characterizing
the particular events and processes. They are the White-
headian eternal objects in the guise of material objects.
Thus, material bodies appear to be the basic particulars
for which we are searching. They are observable, diverse,
^ ibia .
.
p. ^5.
•^Whitehead recognized two "realms" of actuality. These
were eternal objects (forms) and actual entities (process).
Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, "Process and Reality," Alfred North
Whitehead: An Anthology , ed. by P. S. C. Northrop and Mason
Gross (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1961)
.
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stable, ar.8 enduring They are basic constituents which
secure for us one common and continuously extendable framework
Terence
— the framework of spatial location.
?rora our Previous discussion it can be seen that
Strawson's conclusions are not at all surprising. What Is of
great Importance to our study is the fact that Strawson was
led to recognize the existence of a conceptual scheme, a
spatloteraporal framework which we all must possess as a
condition of particular identification and thus a condition
of our experience being coherent.
However, let us now probe deeper into Strawson's
conceptual scheme to ascertain the exact nature of this
concept. He maintains:
... It cannot be denied that each of us, at any
moment, in possession of such a framework a unified
framework of knowledge of particulars, in which we
ourselves, and, usually, our immediate surroundings
have their place, and of which each element is
uniquely related to every other and hence to ourselves
and our surroundings. This framework we use for this
purpose: not just occasionally and adventitiously
,
but always and essentially.
. . . when we become
sophisticated, we systematize the framework with
calendars, maps, co-ordiante jgystems; but the U3 e of
such systems turns, fundamentally, on our knowing our
own place in them; though a. man may lose his place
and have to be told it.
. . . the system of spatio-
temporal relations has a peculiar comprehensiveness
and pervasiveness, which qualify it uniquely to serve
as the framework within which we may organize our
individuating thought ©bout particulars. Every
particular either has its place in this system, i 3 of
a kind the members of which cannot in general be
identified except by reference to particulars of other
kinds which have their place in it; and every
particular which has its place in the system has a
unique place there. 1?
17Strawson, op, clt .. p. 24.
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He further states:
a£r?®» then, that we build up our single oicturp
*MM
sometimes, with the roughest locations of the
*
situations and objects we speak of, allowing agreedproper names to bear, without further explanation animmense individuating load. This we do quite rationallvconfident of a certain community of experience and ^ *sources of instruction. Yet it Is a single picture
qp?lr>,
bU ld
* ? unified structure, in which we our-
nc
1V
o a^
aVC\? pxac f» ln which every element is thoughtdl
^
ectlY or indirectly related to every other*'and the framework of the structure, the common, unifyingsystem of relations is spatiotemporal
. By means of
* °
identifying references, we fit other people’s reports
and stories, along with our own, into the single storvabout empirical reality; and this fitting together, this
nests ultimately upon relating the particulars
which figure in the stories in the single spatiotemporal
system which we ourselves occupy. 18
//hat Strawson has found is a necessary spatiotemporal
framework which we all must possess. This "conceptual scheme"
is reminiscent of the priority of space and time in the
Kantian system. If you recall, Kant maintained that space
and time are pure forms of intuition—subjective mental forms-
which must be presupposed for a thing to be known objectively
to the inquiring mind. Strawson’s formulation gives substance
to this belief. Let us further investigate this notion.
Kant was troubled with the problem of explaining how
subjective sense data can become objectified. If we merely
received impressions or experienced modifications of
consciousness, we would be shut up in our own subjectivity,
each with his own uncommuni cable solipsistic world. Our
sensations, Kant believed, must be objectified, must be rendered
18
Ibid
.
,
p.24.
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communicable anfl intelligible for knowledge. Kant's solution
to the problem of how such objectification occurs in
sensibility is presented in the Transcendental Aesthetic,
briefly, Kant believes that the mind contributes form to the
matter of sensation. These forms are pure intuitions of
space and time. As such, sensations are objectified by the
mind's spatiotemporalizlng these "raw feels." The mind, then
superimposes the forms of space and time upon the manifold of
sensation allowing for our objective knowledge of particulars
in space and time.
In this connection, Strawson asks: "What are the general
conditions of identification of particulars?"^ This
question may be construed as a typically Kantian question;
for, like Strawson, Kant was concerned with the conditions
that must be presupposed for objective knowledge. As such,
Strawson's philosophy concerns itself with typically Kantian
problems viewed from a linguistic perspective. Accordingly,
both Kant and Strawson recognize a special priority given to
spatial and temporal considerations in perception and
cognition. Each finds space and time the key to the problem
of ob jectifioation
.
However, differing from Kant, Strawson believes that the
clue to the problem of explaining how private sense data are
objectified lies in language, the medium of objectivity. It
is also seen that the paradigm case of objectivity is our
IQ
Strawson, op. oit
.. p. 23 .
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agreement in identifying and referring to particulars. As
one of the functions of language is to refer, Strawson
investigates the linguistic process of referring. Proceeding
accordingly, it is found that we must recognize the existence
of a conceptual scheme which we all must possess as a condition
of identifying reference to particulars. This scheme is a
unified spatiotemporal framework in which particulars,
ourselves, and our immediate surroundings, have their place.
Ihus, space and time serve as the framework in which we may
organize our individuating thoughts about particulars. This
conceptual scheme, then, must be presupposed as a condition
of objectivity, in the sense that the objectivity of
particulars logically involves the necessity of their location
in our spatiotemporal framework.
It may be seen that although Strawson and Kant attack
the problem of objectivity from different perspectives, the
results of their endeavors appear greatly similar. However,
in the light of our previous discussion of criticism of the
Kantian hypothesis, certain doubts have emerged as to the
validity of Kant’s theory of perception. Although Strawson
makes few explicit references to the Kantian system, it would
behoove us to examine the Strawsonian contention with an eye
toward improvements which may be made on the doctrine set
forth in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Such improvements
would make for a more secure version of Kant's philosophy,
giving it a base in language and linguistic philosophy and
rendering it intelligible in the light of the previously
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discussed criticism. Let us proceed to this attempt.
It is immediately to be noted that Strawson finds space
and time to be part of a conceptual scheme. Kant, on the
other hand, maintained that neither space nor time are
concepts, but are intuitions. At first glance there seems
to be a basic disagreement between these two doctrines.
Kant believes tha t we cannot represent to ourselves the
absence of space or time. Ue can successfully think away
objects, but not their spatiality or temporality. Thus,
sp-ce and time are pure intuitions. However, Strawson states:
... no system which does not allow for spatial andtemporal entities can be a system which allows for
u«
r
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8 aL?n ’ ?r at least can be understood by
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h \ I)0irit iS the Same as that made ^
orLtuition?§O
that SpaCe and time are our only forms
It seems, then, that the Strawson ian conceptual scheme
and the Kantian theory of sensibility do not clash as
dramatically as it first appeared. It is true that Strawson
deals in conception
—the conceptual use of language in
reference—while Kant deals in sensation and sensibility.
However, the Strawsonian conceptual scheme is as much pertinent
to perception as it is to conception. We could not, for
example, perceive a particular objectively without giving it
a place in our spatiotemporal framework. Thus, both Kant and
Strawson seem to be saying the same thing; that space and time
must be presupposed as a condition of objective knowledge of
a particular.
20Strawson, op. cit
.
.
p. 119.
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However, Kant maintained that space is the form of outer
intuition and time the form of inner intuition. As such, all
representations are in inner sense, of which time is the form;
only some representations occurring in outer sense in which
space is the form. On the other hand, Strawson presents us
with a formal spat iotemporal framework in which space and
time are of equal importance. In this connection, Strawson
asks: "Could there be a scheme, providing for a system of
objective particulars, 'which was wholly non-spatial?
Indeed, the second chapter of Individuals explores the
possibility of a no-space world. This attempt, Strawson
admits, fails due to the impossibility of arriving at a scheme
that would explain how recurring auditory objects could be
individuated. However, these considerations aside, it is
important to note that Strawson believes that space and time
must work together as a spatiotemporal framework. He states:
We operate with the scheme of a single, unified
spatiotemporal system. The system is unified in
this sense. Of things of which it makes sense to
inquire about the spatial position, we think it is
always significant not only to ask how any two such
things are spatially related at any one time, the
same for each, but also to inquire about the spatial
relations of any one thing at any moment of its
history, when the moments may be different. Thus we
say: A is now in just the place where B was a thousand
years ago. 'e have, then, the idea of a system of
elements every one of which can be both spatially and
temporally related to every other. 22
If you recall, this was Baton's point of criticism of the
2 1Ibid
.
,
p. 62.
^ Ibid
.
. p. 31.
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Kantian doctrine. He similarly called for the togetherness
of space and time. Thus, the togetherness of space and time
as a spatioternporal framework seems to be somewhat of an
improvement upon the Kantian contention, while still retaining
the Kantian meaning.
As previously discussed, one of the faults found with
the Kantian theory of sensibility concerned his notion of
geometry. According to Kant, our pure intuition of space is
responsible for the certainty of geometry, in this case,
Euclidian geometry. It has been pointed out that Kant was
wholly unaware of the possibility of constructing non-
Euclid ian geometries as certain and as true of the world as
his own Euclidian. The idea that geometry and mathematics
may be presented as formal systems without regard to empirical
considerations was unknown at Kant's time. Many believe
Kant's theory of mathematics and geometry is an integral part
of his system. The failure of this theory to stand up to
modern developments in mathematics and geometry, it is believed,
easts grave doubts upon the entire Kantian theory of knowledge.
Whether or not this strongly critical view of Kant is
philosophically tenable will not be decided here. It is,
however, important to note that Strawson's formulation avoids
Kant's assumptions of the nature of mathematics and geometry.
While Kpnt maintains that pure intuitions of space and time
account for mathematical and geometrical certainty, Strawson
makes no such demands upon his spatioternporal framework.
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Let us now investigate Russell’s criticism of the Kantian
system as it pertains to Strawson's contention. Russell, it
is recalled, asked for an explanation of why particulars are
positioned the way they are in time and space and not other-
wise. It was mentioned that Kant never seemed to sense the
importance of such an explanation. Accordingly, it is not
enough to say that we contribute space and time to the matter
of sensibility; some additional explanation is needed to
explain why certain particulars are spatiotemporally related
to others the way they are.
hart maintained that the manifold of sensation is unified
(objectified) by the mind’s application of the pure forms of
space and time. To be known as objects, the manifold must
first be spatiotemporalized
. What lies outside of objective
perception is the manifold of things-in-themselves. Things-
in-themselves are the matter of our sensations, the sub-
stratum of sensibility forever unknown to the inquiring mind.
Io is not surprising, then, to see that one cannot explain
or defend Kant's system against Russell's criticism. Space
and time give only the form of sensation. On the other hand,
the matter of sensation is unknowable. 'e cannot explain the
relation of objects completely on either level. However,
Strawson assumes no unknowable substratum of sensation. While
Kant assumes an intrinsically unknowable "given," Strawson
assumes that the matter of sensation is sense data. Thus,
Strawson's formulation provides for the same product of
form and matter (perception), while avoiding the pitfalls of
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assuming a given unknowable. According to Strawson, then,
the peculiar positioning of particulars is traceable to the
given and to our linguistic practices of referring.
In summation, both Kant and Strawson deal with a similar
problem; how private sense data are objectified for knowledge.
Kant maintains the existence of pure spatial and temporal
intuitions through which things-in-themselves are spatio-
temporalized for objectivity. Time is the form of all
intuitions, space only of some. On the other hand, Strawson
investigated the media of objectivity, language, with the
hope of disclosing a conceptual scheme which we all must
possess as a condition of our objective reference to
particulars.
-his scheme was found to be a spatiotemporal
framework in which each particular has its place. Moreover,
Strawson avoids certain Kantian assumptions which are no
longer tenable in the light of modern physics and mathematics.
Whereas Kantian philosophy led to the recognition of unknown
things— in— themselves
,
Ltrawson does without such an ambiguous
concept. As such, Strawson’s account avoids many of the
pitfalls of the Kantian theory of sensibility.
Strawson's philosophy gives substance to Kantian
metaphysics while pruning it of many of its untenable
assumptions and avoidable consequences. Language is seen to
exhibit the presence of a conceptual scheme embodying a
spatiotemporal framework. As such, particulars are positioned
according to our linguistic practices of referring. Thus,
language is again presented as a basis for Kantian philosophy.
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'jpa°e ani Ume are vlewed as embedded within the structure
of language, composing a spatiotemporal framework through
whioh our Individuating thoughts about particulars and
objectification of private sensations are explained.
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
As we have seen, the fundamental problem for Kant is
the problem of knowledge; what is knowledge, and how is it
possible, what are the boundaries of human reason? In order
to answer such questions, Kant believes, we must examine our
organs of knowledge, our ways of knowing. We must consider
the powers of the mind to attain knowledge, its functions,
its possibilities
,
its limitations. Accordingly, we cannot
think unless there is something to think about, and we can
have no object of thought unless it is given through the
senses, unless the mind is receptive or has sensibility.
Sensibility, then, furnishes us with objects of empirical
intuition. However, these objects must be thought, understood,
or conceived by the understanding for knowledge to occur.
The question, then, "How is knowledge possible?" divides into
two questions: "How is perception possible?" and "How is
understanding possible?".
If you recall, in the realm of sensibility, the matter
of sensation is given to the inquiring mind as a manifold of
sensation. The mind, however, contributes form to this
manifold, unifying (objectifying) it as objects of possible
knowledge. These mental forms, Kant maintains, are pure
intuitions of space and time. As such, space and time are not
109
realities existing for themselves, nor are they qualities or
relations of things. They are ways our sensibility has of
apprehending objects, they are forms or functions of the senses,
In the realm of the understanding, objects must be
compared, related, or n synthesized " for knowledge to result.
Tt is Kant’s belief that synthesis proceeds by way of a set
of formal categories which act a s criteria and set of rules
for these mental operations. Thus, knowledge occurs through
application of the pure concepts of the understanding
(categories) to objects furnished us by the senses and
perceived as spatial and temporal.
The mind, then, prescribes its laws to nature. The world
as we know it is pre-organized according to our ways of
knowing. On this view, man is no longer thought of as a
neutral observer of reality, related to the world as subject
is to object. Instead, man participates in nature, actively
organizing and structuring it according to the way he perceives
and thinks it. As such, the world as we know it is a joint
product of the knower and the known.
In the later nineteenth century and early twentieth
century, many philosophers ignored or vehemently criticised
these Kantian ideas. Early linguistic philosophers, disavow-
ing themselves from the traditional methods of philosophical
speculation, wore even more distrustful of the "teutonic 11
philosophy of Kant and his followers. One commonly held
opinion was that of Bertrand Russell. He said the following
of Kant:
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Hume
. . . awakened him [Kant] from his dogmatic
slumbe
,
5 s--so at least he says, but the awakening
was only temporary, and he soon invented a soporific
which enabled him to sleep again.
1
dhile the English speaking world continued to ignore the
teachings of Kant, the Kantian tradition had not died in
Germany. Agreeing with the basic tenets of Kant's philosophy,
Ern s t Cassirer, an avowed neo-Kan tian, endeavored to rebuild
the Kantian scheme in the face of its most devastating
criticism. Because Kant had based much of the internal work-
ings of his system upon an outmoded Aristotelian logic and
Newtonian science, Cassirer found Kant's system in great need
of revision. Cassirer's attempt at revision recognized a new
factor serving as a base for Kant's philosophy, a factor which
intrigued most philosophers of the day. This factor was
language. As such, Cassirer contended that language presents
the forms in which the manifold of sensation is objectified.
Furthermore, language is seen to provide a more inclusive set
of categories by which these objects are "synthesized” for
knowledge. Language accomplishes this mission by imbuing its
speakers with "perspectives" in which to interpret the world.
However, Cassirer's view, although quite tenacious,
admits the impossibility of testing its own hypothesis. If
the world appears to us as so many linguistic "perspectives,"
it necessarily follows that one cannot escape the confines of
"^Bertrand Russell, A History of Nostern Philosophy (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 19^5) » P* 704.
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his particular perspective adequately to judge the theory
under question. In this connection, two linguists, Vhorf and
Sapir, formulated a hypothesis strikingly similar to Cassirer’s
view. However, as an improvement over the former thesis, they
contended that their beliefs were amenable to empirical proof.
The so-called wVhorf-Sapir hypothesis" may be seen to
assert two doctrines: linguistic relativity and linguistic
determinism. Briefly, linguistic relativity maintains that
a given language embodies a world view—a particular meta-
physical pattern in which the "kaleidoscopic flux of
experience" is shaped and molded to make for an intelligible
world. Determinism goes beyond this belief. It holds that
language not only embodies a world view, but perpetuates that
view. As such, one's thought is uniquely determined by what
one's language allows him to think. Thus, once again language
is seen to provide a basis for the Kantian system. In
perception and thought the mind is actively engaged in giving
form to the formless "raw feels" of experience. Knowledge is
seen to arise as a joint effort of the observer and the
observed. While Kant held that intuitions of space and time
in perception and categories operative in the understanding
present form to the world, Whorf maintains that language
underlies these Kantian forms.
However, a closer study of Whorf 's hypothesis as it is
presented reveals certain difficulties which cast grave doubts
as to its adequacy. Nevertheless, a mild form of the
doctrine of linguistic relativity has approached the status
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of a scientific hypothesis in the hands of other researchers.
Accordingly, there is reason to believe that language does
more than merely mirror or "copy" the world as traditional
philosophy had assumed. As such, a given language may be
seen to encourage or discourage its speaker's formulation of
certain world views or posits of experience. However, this
sense of linguistic relativity is far from what Whorf had
claimed. A* regards Kant, there remains the hope that future
studies in linguistics and psycho-linguistics may reveal
relationships between language and thought that give further
substance to his basic beliefs.
As previously mentioned, early linguistic philosophers,
by and large, found Kant's philosophy peculiarly distasteful.
£et, their methods dealt with an area of study pertinent to
Kant's doctrines, namely, the analysis of meaning in language.
In this connection, several modern linguistic philosophers
have found that an analysis of language yields evidence for
the belief that we all are in possession of a conceptual
scheme by way of which random raw experience is ordered and
structured. The relationship expressed here is again the
Kantian notion of objectification and synthesis, where the
mind is seen to present form to the formless. As such, these
modern philosophers have returned Kant to a respectable
position in the area of analytic philosophy.
As an example of the presence of Kantian ideas in analytic
philosophy, I have presented some of the main points of P. F.
Strawson's "descriptive metaphysics." In concept, descriptive
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metaphysics mirrors the Kantian attempt at metaphysics, laying
bare "the most general structural features of our ordinary
thinking about the world." 2 It is Strawson's contention that
objectivity is directly connected to reference to external
objects (particulars)
,
which in turn is intimately related
to language, the medium in which reference takes place. One
of the functions of language, then, is to refer to and
identify particulars. Upon analysis of linguistic reference,
Strawson is led to the belief that we all possess a conceptual
scheme as a condition of particular recognition, i.e., objec-
tivity. this conceptual scheme is seen to be mainly spatio-
temporal. ihus, both Kant and Strawson recognize a special
priority given to spatiotemporal considerations. Both claim
that the key to understanding the question of how sense data
are ob jectii ied lies in the nature of our mental processes.
However, Strawson goes beyond Kant in showing that these
mental processes are part and parcel of the workings of our
language.
In summation, I have attempted to present the main views
of Kantian philosophy as well as how these views have been
augmented and substantiated by some recent developments in
the general area of philosophy of language. Philosophy of
language has attempted to render explicit the true functions
of language. In so doing, it has come to the position that
p
P. P. Strawson, Individuals—An Essay in Descriptive
Metaphysics (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1959^ p. 9.
m
language is more than a mere transparent medium of
communication, that it may be regulative or even constitutive
of experience. As far as this may be true, the philosophy of
language presents a great deal of substance to Kant's basic
thought: that the world "out there" is as much a product of
tue knower is it is a product of the known.
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